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ABSTRACT
The Long March of the German 68ers: Their Protest, Their Exhibition, and Their
Administration

by
Gracie M. Morton

The postwar children coming of age in the late 1960s in West Germany mounted a widesweeping socio-political protest against what they saw as the strangling silence of their
parents, the Nazi generation. These protesters, referred to as the 68ers for their pivotal
year, continued their struggle in following decades, incorporating an important and
controversial exhibition, and finally culminating in their own administration thirty years
from their defining moment. Using such diverse kinds of information as parliamentary
debates, interviews, and contemporary criticism, this thesis explores the impact of the
68ers’ initial protest and the influence they ultimately had on their nation and society.
The 68ers changed the face of German society by forcing a dialogue with the past that
made a full exploration of the Nazi generation possible in Germany. They also
incorporated gender politics into their protest and forced a social revolution that allowed
a woman to be elected Chancellor.
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CHAPTER 1
DIE NACHKRIEGSKINDER
There was a strange dichotomy in the West German society of the 1960s: on the
one hand there were the Nachkriegskinder (the postwar children) who challenged those
they believed to be Nazis in the government of the Federal Republic; and on the other
hand there were numerous West Germans who were tired of the seemingly endless guilt
for National Socialism. The student activists of the Nachkriegskinder who strove to
expose fascism in their society would eventually be called 68ers for the most explosive
year, 1968, a year marked by violence and protest. But there is an irony to the 68ers. By
the time they began their protests in the mid to late 1960s, their parents’ generation (the
Nazi generation) was busy attempting to erase their guilt in many ways: balancing guilt
with personal suffering; staunch philo-Semitism; and reparations payments to victims of
National Socialism. This generation, called the silent generation by their children, for the
most part found discussing their National Socialist past too difficult. There were histories
and other books being written, but these were largely esoteric studies done by experts
which did not venture beyond the academic realm. “It is entirely symptomatic when the
writer Marcel Reich-Ranicki relates in his autobiography The Author of Himself that the
first person in post-Nazi Germany to ask him about his concentration camp experiences
was a journalist, in the late 1960s. Her name was Ulrike Meinhof, the future terrorist.”1
In protest against this silence and what the student activists saw as the hypocrisy
and rampant materialism of a West Germany democratic government that employed
many former Nazis, the 68ers revolted against everything they believed their parents

1

Stephan and Norbert Lebert, My Father’s Keeper: Children of Nazi Leaders—an Intimate History of
Damage and Denial, trans. Julian Evans (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2001), 190.
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represented. The activism of the German 68ers “was especially motivated by a sense of
shock about National Socialism, which, however, was soon instrumentalized to cast
doubt on German and middle-class ways of thinking and life-styles and on the social
order in general.”2 In West Germany in the 1960s, that social order included a close
relationship with the United States and Israel. Sparked in part by the Vietnam War and in
part by tensions in the Middle East, many students demonstrated against America and
Israel and protested, ironically, in favor of Palestinians, their generation’s “Jewish”
victims. In turning their backs on everything their parents had come to represent, some
of these activists eventually became anti-Semitic.
In West Germany in the 1960s there was a precarious balance between many who
were tired of Nazi guilt and leftist activists who wanted to force their fellow Germans to
confront history. But the Nachkriegskinder felt no responsibility for Nazi crimes; they
bore the consequence of the guilt without having committed the acts responsible for the
guilt. They had to bow under the pressure of this burden without understanding why.
Their parents refused to address history at home and the details of the subject were taboo
socially. What the postwar generation learned about National Socialist history they
acquired outside the home. Young West Germans were exposed to facts about the Nazis
and their crimes (books, plays, highly publicized trials), but reticence reigned at home.
Unspoken guilt for having supported or participated in a criminal government and painful
memories of personal suffering (i.e., the firebombing of Dresden and starvation rations)
created in the typical West German home something psychologist Margarete Hecker

2

Christian Meier, “Condemning and Comprehending,” in Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original
Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust, trans.
James Knowlton and Truett Cates (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1993), 27.
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called the “solidarity of silence.”3 In order to create and continue with a normal life, the
parents from the Nazi generation established a status quo of muteness in which their
children often felt stifled. In the classroom and in the public arena, the Nachkriegskinder
were linked to the Nazi past through education and reparations, but the connection was
lost or denied at home. Their identity and their roots as Germans were missing. “The
facts about the Third Reich, which were transmitted in their school or in the media, could
not provide them with the knowledge of their own roots since, as a closed topic in their
own families, the subject found no personal echo.”4 The confusion created by this
discontinuity led quite often to frustration that eventually found an outlet in accusation
and political demonstration. The distance between them and their parents’ generation the
Nachkriegskinder expanded with their activism, with many of them joining the New Left
or opposition groups dedicated to fighting the fascism they believed was continuing to
control Germany secretly.
The New Left and the philosophers of the Frankfurt School influenced these
young radicals of 1960s’ Germany. Students and street-fighters mobilized in an
impassioned protest against what they saw as the continuity between the Third Reich and
the Federal Republic of Germany. Freedom-revoking legislation, the Vietnam War, and
conflict in the Middle East spawned a number of demonstrations across West Germany,
sparking violence between the state and its youth in the 1960s and 1970s.

3

Margarete Hecker, “Family Reconstruction in Germany: An Attempt to Confront the Past,” in The
Collective Silence: German Identity and the Legacy of Shame, ed. Barbara Heimannsberg and Christoph J.
Schmidt, trans. Cynthia Oudejans Harris and Gordon Wheeler (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993), 75.
4
Ibid., 90.
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CHAPTER 2
OVERCOMING A SILENCE: THE CONTINUITY OF THE THIRD REICH AND THE
PROTEST OF THE 68ERS

Student protestors and street-fighters saw a terrible continuity in the 1960s
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Third Reich. Fascism was perhaps
their most important and their most pervasive enemy in the eyes of the 68ers of the
Nachkriegsgeneration. The German New Left’s definition of fascism made it a reaction
of capitalist economies. Therefore, many influential intellectuals of West Germany did
not see the Federal Republic’s democratic capitalism as a break from fascism. They also
called the policies of the new democracy authoritarian when they outlawed communist
political parties and passed the Notstandgesetzte (Emergency Laws), which were
designed to suspend freedoms in times of national emergency. The Notstandgesetzte,
especially, appeared to be a frightening reminder of Nazism when intellectuals and
student protestors pointed to the emergency measure that placed Hitler in power in 1933.
Nazis Still in Power
It was not government policy alone that reminded the Nachkriegskinder of
National Socialism; several politicians and government officials were former members of
the NSDAP.5 In January of 1960, Time Magazine published an article about Nazis in
West German government positions. Time reported that one out of every three West
German members of parliament was a former Nazi along with approximately half of all
senior civil servants. Eight Federal Republic ambassadors in 1960 were former Nazi

5

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei, the National Socialist German Workers Party.

8

party members. 6 By 1965, sixty percent of West Germany’s military officers had fought
for the Third Reich while two-thirds of the judges had served under the Nazi regime.7 It
was not limited to civil servants and judges; there were also a number of highly visible
public officials who were former Nazis.
Hans Krüger participated in the failed Beer Hall Putsch in 1923 and later worked
as a Nazi judge in Konitz (now in northern Poland). He served as an officer in the
Wehrmacht8 from 1943 to 1945. After World War II, he joined the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU)9 and was a member of the Bundestag (parliament) from 1957 to 1965.
Krüger also served a term as Minister for Expellees, Refugees, and War Claimants in
1963 but lost this position because of his suspected involvement in war crimes.
According to Yad Vashem, Krüger was an SS-Captain in charge of the mass murder
operations in Stanislawow in southeastern Galicia carried out by the GrenzpolizeiKommissariat (Border Police).10 A court, however, denied that there was evidence to
support his guilt.
Theodor Oberländer joined the NSDAP in 1933, became a professor at Ernst
Moritz Arndt University, and worked actively to make it judenfrei (Jew-free). After the
Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, he served on the eastern front as an officer with the
Nightingale Battalion in Lvov in 1941 where he conducted anti-partisan warfare. After
the war, he became a member of Konrad Adenauer’s government in 1953 and joined the

6

“The Haunted Past,” Time Magazine, 25 January 1960. Database online. http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/archives, s.v. “Theodor Oberlaender;” accessed 9 May 2007.
7
Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home: the Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and
Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 2004), 33.
8
The National Socialist military.
9
The CDU is a conservative political party.
10
Dieter Pohl, “Hans Krueger and the Murder of the Jews in the Stanislawow Region (Galicia).” Yad
Vashem. Available from http://www.yadvashem.org, s.v. “Hans Krueger;” accessed 9 May 2007.
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CDU in 1956. In January 1960, he appeared before the Hague to deny accuations that he
had participated in the Lvov Massacre of over 2,000 people. He claimed the Soviets had
killed those people before he arrived. An East German court tried and convicted him in
absentia for that massacre and sentenced him to life in prison. Protesting the trial and his
innocence, Oberländer resigned from the West German government.11
Hans Josef Maria Globke was one of the men who had formulated the emergency
powers act that put Hitler in power in 1933. He managed to escape the official label of
Nazi when Martin Bormann denied his application for party membership in 1940 for
reason of Globke’s past involvement with the Center Party.12 After the war, Globke
became the national security advisor to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. But it was one of
Adenauer’s successors, Kurt Georg Kiesinger who made some of the biggest headlines in
West Germany in the 1960s. Kiesinger became the head of the Große Koalition (Great
Coalition) and Chancellor of West Germany in 1966. Kiesinger had joined the NSDAP
in 1933 and worked as a propaganda minister for the Nazis. After the war, he joined the
CDU and became a member of parliament in 1949.13 In 1968, after a very public
confrontation with Kiesinger in West Berlin, Beate Klarsfeld and her husband made it
their crusade to “out” Kiesinger and others as Nazis.14
The issue of the number of Nazis in government positions in the Federal Republic
began in 1948 when the United States ended the denazification program within its zone
of occupation. This meant that a large number of former Nazi party members and other
11

“The Haunted Past”, Time Magazine, January 25, 1960.
A Catholic-based, non-fascist political party.
13
Deutsches Historisches Museum Berlin LeMO: Lebendiges virtuelles Museum Online, “Biographie: Kurt
Georg Kiesinger, 1904-1988.” Available from http://www.dhm.de/lemo/suche, s.v. “Kiesinger;” accessed 3
June 2007.
14
KlarsfeldFoundation.org, “An Introduction.” Available from http://www.klarsfeldfoundation.org;
accessed 28 May 2007.
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participants in the regime were able to reenter society without much effort. More than a
few entered politics and by 1968, Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Heinrich Lübke, both former
members of the NSDAP, held two of the highest offices in West Germany: Chancellor
and President, respectively.15 It was quite common, especially under Konrad Adenauer’s
administration, to find a number of former Nazis (both “denazified” and otherwise)
holding key government positions. The philosopher Karl Jaspers blamed the Western
Allies for this, writing in 1966 that the old-line politicians had been forced on the
Germans out of expediency.16
Inner Emigration and the Weapon of Nazism
Mirroring the politicians in their efforts to forget about the past, the authors of
postwar Germany called for a Kahlschlag, an attempt to remove the influence of Nazism
from the German language, and therefore literature. Some German authors spoke of
“inner emigration;” this was the process by which artists and writers managed to resist
the Nazi regime, passively, by keeping themselves removed intellectually. The
Kahlschlag, in conjunction with the exoneration from inner emigration, was supposed to
provide Germany’s postwar authors with a new beginning free of any taint of National
Socialism. Thomas Mann, an exiled German author, criticized inner emigration17 and
later, the authors of the 1960s exposed this Kahlschlag as ineffective. Meanwhile, most
of the immediate postwar literature dealt with the war and Nazism in purely abstract,
even allegorical, terms.18 It was the female authors such as Elisabeth Langgässer (Das
unauslöschliche Siegel, 1946) who addressed the National Socialist period, the war, and
15

Rob Burns, ed., German Cultural Studies: an introduction (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press,
1995), 213.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid., 223.
18
Ibid., 223-224.
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the issues arising out of both directly. These female authors, largely ignored until the
mid to late 1960s, wrote about all the issues the 68ers wanted their history to address,
such as “daily life under fascism, resistance efforts, the civilian war experience, the
persecution of the Jews, and concentration camps.”19 But such works, by and large, did
not reach West German students until the issue of women’s rights was raised and
seriously considered in the 1960s. “The widespread resistance to women’s participation
in cultural and intellectual life was reflected in a survey of faculty members at West
German universities in 1960, which found that 64 per cent of respondents were opposed
to allowing women even to attend university, 4 per cent were neutral on the subject, and
32 per cent stood somewhere between neutrality and opposition; in addition 79 per cent
objected to the idea of hiring women at lecturer level or above.”20 This discrimination in
higher education would not begin to break down until the student activists forced the
issue by introducing gender politics into the national debate. Women authors and their
treatment of the National Socialist past would have to be forced upon universities which
were still bastions of male dominance; and this in a country that was actively and legally
encouraging, even forcing women to be housewives and mothers. Begun in the Adenauer
administration, the government of the Federal Republic provided National Socialist-like
incentives to women and families to have many children by giving Kindergeld
(government assistance) to the family for every child produced after the second one.21
Led by conservative politicians and church leaders, the Federal Republic promoted
extremely traditional sexual and family values.

19

Ibid., 228.
Ibid., 230.
21
Ibid., 216.
20
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According to many of the Christian leaders in postwar Germany, the primary
moral issue facing the German people in the 1950s was sexuality, rather than as Lothar
Kreyssig22 believed, the guilt for Nazi crimes. A result of this emphasis on sexual
morality made sexuality and sexual freedom an important issue for the Nachkriegskinder,
and the 68ers melded this with images of the Holocaust to use in their attack on the
institutions of power. Their mixing of Holocaust study with sexual issues was not purely
academic, however. The term Nazi had become a harsh way to denounce an opponent
and mixing metaphors of genocide with gender and sexual issues created a hyperbole to
strengthen the argument in favor of sexual and feminist liberation.23 Growing up in the
repressive 1950s, the Nachkriegskinder were bombarded with the message that “the
Nazis themselves encouraged promiscuity and illegitimacy and that their sexual
immorality was inseparable from their other crimes.”24 To make their argument,
however, New Leftists reversed this and argued that the Nazis were sexually repressed
which led to them to commit mass murder and other atrocities. Certainly there was a
strong element of male chauvinism permeating National Socialism, but the cause and
effect between sexual repression and genocide would remain theoretical.
The parents’ generation repeatedly brought up such terms as Nazi and Nazism in
the postwar years, but not in an effort to analyze guilt issues. These terms were used as
buzzwords in discussions of sex to invoke an immediate response of revulsion, horror, or
fear. They used Nazism as a sexual morality lesson. The war generation were not
22

Kreyssig was the founder of Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste, a non-profit charitable organization
dedicated to physically and psychologically rebuilding Germany’s relationship with the victims of the
Third Reich.
23
Dagmar Herzog, “’Pleasure, Sex, and Politics Belong Together’: Post-Holocaust Memory and the Sexual
Revolution in West Germany,” Critical Inquiry 24, no. 2, Intimacy (Winter 1998): 397-398. Database
online. http://www.jstor.org, s.v. “68ers;” accessed 8 May 2007.
24
Ibid., 397.
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dealing with the past, they were using a terrible thing from their past to scare their
children into behaving in an acceptable way; and thus, in the 1950s’ arguments about
sexuality, Nazism was used as a scare tactic. In so doing, the parents were still avoiding
the issue of their generation’s crimes. Instead, the Third Reich had become a morality
play where the decadent Nazis were outlasted by the abstemious good Germans and
abstinence became the definition of the non-Nazi in the 1950s in West Germany. The
68ers fought against this repressive definition by, ironically, using the same weapon as
their parents. The accusation of Nazism was to remain a political, social, or moral
weapon.25
Sexuality and Hypocrisy
The 68ers, in a bid to further a sexual revolution, latched on to the psychological
studies of Erich Fromm, Alexander Mitscherlich, and Reinhart Westphal. The students
read scholarship that proposed sexual repression led to an increase in aggression which, if
not released in a healthy fashion, would lead to murder as an extreme result. One
philosophy PhD, Arno Plack, used the Auschwitz Trials of the early 1960s as fodder for
his research into this issue in 1967. His study was concerned not only with the SS
officers on trial, but also with the lack of popular public support for those trials by some
members of the German population; specifically, “older members of society [who] called
loudly for the punishment of rapists and murderers but [who] were disinclined to support
the Auschwitz Trials.”26 Puzzled over the lack of positive response from some members
of the war generation, Plack sought an explanation and proposed that “the liberties taken

25

Ulrich Schlie, “Today’s View of the Third Reich and the Second World War in German
Historiographical Discourse,” The Historical Journal 43, no. 2 (June 2000): 543-545. Database online.
http://www.jstor.org, s.v. “Historikerstreit Vergangenheitsbewältigung;” accessed 23 September 2006.
26
Herzog, “’Pleasure, Sex, and Politics,’” 403.
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by individual criminals bothered people, but murderers in uniform were an object of
identification.”27 Plack’s work in 1967 strove to analyze the causes of fascism and
violence by studying not only the perpetrators but also those in his society who were
bystanders and their motives for supporting or not supporting the punishment of the war
criminals. Plack’s work, specifically, also begged the question: how could someone
seem to be so respectable in one moment only to become a sadistic monster the next?
“As one member after another of the generation of 1968 would later testify, the similarity
between the code of good behavior postwar society demanded of them and the model of
behavior evidently exemplified by the executors of genocide, sickened them deeply.”28
The people who, when not guarding concentration camps or participating in extreme
violence on the front lines, were perfectly behaved and respectable bourgeois types,
became even more horrific and monstrous after the revelation of the banality of evil29, as
Hannah Arendt wrote. The Nachkriegskinder were forced to look at their own parents
and wonder what they had done during the war, especially those with fathers who had
returned from POW camps. They were torn between defending their parents (my father
was a Nazi but he did not do those things) and accusing them to rid themselves of that
burden of guilt (my father may have killed a Jew but it has nothing to do with me).
The 68ers took this in a different direction, demanding an accounting from an
entire generation. But, such realizations were deeply shocking for the Nachkriegskinder
precisely for the reason that it was about their parents. This was not knowledge learned
at home over the course of years but sickening realizations forced by the socio-political
27

Ibid.
Ibid.
29
The Banality of Evil was the title of Hannah Arendt’s book based on her interviews with Adolf Eichmann
(a Nazi bureaucrat in charge of the Final Solution) and her coverage of his 1961 trial for crimes against
humanity.
28
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climate of the time. This caused some to fight harder against the bourgeois morality of
their parents which they saw as inherently hypocritical. “Above all, they had a handle on
what came to seem like one of the greatest hypocrisies of postwar society, in Plack’s
words, ‘the secret agreement of the society, that provides cover for the concentration
camp murderer, but at the same time for example denounces the parents of a bride for the
crime of pimping, if they allow the future son-in-law to spend the night.’”30 The psychoanalyzation of the sexual causes behind fascism was a useful weapon to counter the
previous generation’s use of Nazism as a sexual morality weapon. According to the
thinking of such activists as those in Kommune 1,31 anti-authoritarian behavior and
sexual liberation, as the exact opposite of what the Nazi generation advocated both during
the regime and in the democracy afterwards, was the answer. The news magazine, Der
Spiegel, provided support for this in 1967 when it drew correlations between statements
made by church fathers on sexual morality in the postwar years and Hitler’s call to
eliminate elements of provocativeness and eroticism in German culture in his book, Mein
Kampf.32 Of course, in the interest of simplicity, these studies and articles ignored the
ambiguous aspect of the relationship between the Nazis and sexuality.
In conjunction with these confrontations with the bourgeois morality of their
parents, the 68ers and their psychologists framed an attack on the Christian Church of
Germany as well. The Church, an obvious target in their conflict with antiquated
morality, also represented a center of hypocrisy when it came to the crimes of the Third
Reich. The proponents of sexual liberation took the opportunity to uncover the Church’s

30

Herzog, “’Pleasure, Sex, and Politics,’” 403.
A commune established by such leftist activists as Rudi Dutschke, an influential member of several
leftist activist organizations.
32
Herzog, “’Pleasure, Sex, and Politics,’” 406.
31
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prior position in favor of National Socialism. One author popular with the 68ers,
Karlheinz Deschner, in his book The Cross of the Church: A Sexual History of
Christianity, quoted statements made by church leaders who supported the attacks on
sexual immorality made by the Nazi regime. Deschner criticized the unerring stance of
Christianity on sexual morality that gave the impression that sexual promiscuity was a
greater sin than murder. He attacked Rome for its preoccupation with sex rather than
denouncing the slaughter of millions in the camps.33
The churches in postwar Germany were preoccupied with the sexual decency of
the German people, drawing lessons for the public between National Socialist atheism
and sexual explicitness to the regime’s evil and downfall. Neither the destruction of
Europe’s Jews nor the slaughter of millions of people was a part of the churches’
argument. While the religious conservatives manipulated the imagery of Nazi violence to
enforce traditional morality, the psychoanalysis of the Nazi regime favored by the 68ers
married the twin issues of sex and violence and presented a correlation the churches and
the CDU refused to address. The 68ers pointed not only to the similarities between the
Christian religion’s encouragement to procreate and the Third Reich’s laws encouraging
the same thing, but also at historical church support for the regime.
A very important aspect of these attacks on repressive sexual morality was the
fact that the issues of the past were being raised. For the first time since the fall of the
Third Reich, “commentators were quite clearly articulating their horror at what they saw
as the persistence of the Nazi legacy in their present, both as it was directed at children
and as it was aimed at adults.”34 These commentators not only used National Socialism

33
34

Ibid., 408-409.
Ibid., 410.
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as a frame for their arguments but also strove to understand the mindset involved in such
a murderous apparatus as the Third Reich.
But how did both sides of the debate use the same example to make their point?
In postwar Germany the status quo stated that the Nazis were sexually immoral and
therefore morally bankrupt. Out of a desire to prove that they were not Nazis, postwar
Germans dedicated themselves to being the opposite of what they had defined as Nazi,
which meant for them an emphasis on traditional morality. Bourgeois sexual and family
values were a force not only in the home but also in the political arena with the CDU in
political majority until 1966 when it joined with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) to
create the Great Coalition that controlled well over half of parliament. This meant that
“the perspectives the churches fostered were not only the most widely disseminated ones
but also the ones that structured criminal and civil law and state family and welfare
policy.”35 The anti-Nazi sexual mores embraced by the CDU rang false for the 68ers,
especially when they counted how many former Nazis were active in the conservative
postwar political parties.
Political conservatives, sociologists, and religious leaders not only used the taint
of National Socialism as a strategy but also employed the image of genocide as a tactic to
eliminate support for abortion. Dr. Hermann Frühauf was a Catholic doctor who wrote
“Paragraph 218” in 1946 in which he equated abortion with Auschwitz. Part of the
doctor’s agenda was to encourage the birthrate after what was the most destructive and
deadliest war in history, but the use of such a shocking hyperbole was also a moral tactic.
For Frühauf and his supporters, anyone who supported abortion, “whether he intends this
or not; whether he understands this or not, serves those forces and powers, that trespass
35

Ibid., 411.
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against humanity; he finds himself at a particularly dangerous point on that precipitous
slope, that in its last consequences leads to the gas chambers of some Auschwitz.”36 The
issue of abortion was an extremely delicate subject in Germany in the mid 1960s with
many politicians refusing to discuss it. The very idea of abortion reminded many, in a
highly uncomfortable way, of the Nazi T-4 euthanasia and forced sterilization programs.
For many West Germans, abortion was not an issue of women’s reproductive rights but
something too steeped in negative eugenics to be considered.37 The use of Auschwitz,
the Nazis, and genocide by political and religious conservatives as political and moral
tools to mold the public mind stimulated very little argument or outcry until the 68ers
countered by pointing out the National Socialist roots of those who made the argument.
Generational Guilt and the Burden of the Past
The 68ers, in actions ironically similar to that of their parents in the postwar era,
strove to be the opposite of everything the Nazis represented to them and the underlying
conflict between the two generations existed over what the Nazi generation termed the
“guilt obsession.” Some members of the Nachkriegsgeneration (postwar generation), to
counter the attitudes of their parents, turned to anti-authoritarian student revolts in order
to confront the guilt their parents seemed determined to ignore. In the 1960s, children of
the Nazi generation had reached an age where they not only asked questions, but
demanded answers.38
Lothar Baier wrote in Die Zeit in 1987:

36
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For all the self-righteousness and occasional hysteria that
accompanied the outbreak of recuperated antifascism, it
must be admitted that it marked a caesura in West German
postwar history: for the first time, German society in the
FRG39 was compelled from within to confront, politically,
morally, and theoretically, its National Socialist antecedent.
For the first time, the perpetrators who had reached the age
of retirement unpunished found themselves facing the
demand for an explanation, not from foreigners but from
their own children, students, and subordinates. Even
lawmakers had to tow the line and, after a period of
hesitation, exclude Nazi crimes from the statue of
limitations.40
That is the difference between the 1950s and 1960s, the accusations came from home. It
is easier to deny or put aside guilt when it is an outsider placing the blame. The German
people dealt with the issue of guilt on the surface of their society when it was required by
external forces; whether by building memorials or attending trials or paying reparations.
But that was imposed guilt. As the Nachkriegskinder reached adulthood, they began to
demand personal accountings from the previous generation, making the collective guilt
personal and national rather than a burden imposed by external forces. For the first time
since the end of the war, serious accusations were coming from among the Germans
themselves.
During the process of denazification, there were a considerable number of
accusations, but they were based on the guilt of being a National Socialist party member
and not the atrocities of Hitler’s war against the Jews. Denazification differed from the
indictments of the 68ers in that the German accusers from the war generation expected an
outside authority to resolve the issue for them. At surrender, the Nazis became the
responsibility of the occupiers, removing the burden for the regime and the responsibility
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for punishing its proponents from the Germans. After denazification ended in the
American zone in 1948, the Germans prospered under a blanket of approval for having
completed the program. 1950s’ West Germany was characterized by appropriate public
contrition, philo-Semitism, and philo-Zionism. The issue of hidden Nazis was not
addressed again until the 1960s. Germany had been denazified and the German people
considered themselves clean. The Nachkriegskinder, however, growing up in a
struggling democracy weighed down by a fear of communist oppression believed to be
surrounding the nation, accused their parents and their government of avoiding the issue.
As one historian put it, “Hating communism meant one thing: marginalizing the
Holocaust and rebuilding a new Germany.”41
Some young Germans even made attempts to atone for the sins of their parents by
joining Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste. The ASF was founded by an anti-Nazi
German minister named Lothar Kreyssig. After the end of the Second World War,
Kreyssig believed the Christians of Germany had betrayed their ideals and beliefs by
supporting the Third Reich and participating in the Holocaust. In the 1950s, Kreyssig
preached atonement for Germany’s sins. “We Germans began World War II and by this
alone, more than others, we are guilty of bringing immeasurable suffering to humankind.
We ask the peoples who suffered violence at our hands to allow us to perform a good
deed in their countries with our hands and resources…as a sign of atonement.”42
Kreyssig’s organization brought young Germans into contact with the victims of National
Socialism in an effort to promote healing. Young adults would travel to war-torn areas to
41
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rebuild cities and in 1961, were invited to Israel for the first time to work on collective
farms. The young Germans who participated in the ASF had taken their parents’ guilt
onto themselves out of a need to expunge what they saw as Germany’s guilt and their
guilt as Germans. In contrast, the protest of the student activists was based on the guilt of
others, which they saw as divorced from themselves.
In order to study how Germans bore guilt, a survey was conducted in West
Germany in 1961 to gauge people’s responses to the trial of Adolf Eichmann. It
produced intriguing results: 67% of West Germans believed Eichmann should either be
sentenced to death or life with hard labor. This particular survey also included lists of
statements with which the participants could agree or disagree: 59% agreed and 28%
disagreed with the statement, “I personally had nothing to do with it [the Holocaust] and
don’t want to hear anything more about it.” Likewise, 53% agreed and 33% disagreed
with the statement, “it would be best to forget about this affair and to concern ourselves
exclusively with the present and future.” Seventy-two percent of the population of the
Federal Republic in 1961 believed most Germans in the 1940s knew what the Nazis were
doing to the Jews, but 88% denied feeling any guilt for the Holocaust.43 Yet, while the
West German population appeared to be unconcerned with the past, the percentage of
those who believed Germany was solely responsible for WWII rose from 32% in 1951 to
62% in 1967.44 Up to the late 1960s, more and more West Germans believed that their
world image was tied to Nazism. In 1955 only 13% believed Germans were
internationally “unloved,” whereas 38% believed it in 1969. Also, the number of
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Germans in the Federal Republic who desired a cutoff point with their past (Schlussstrich
ziehen—literally, drawing an end-line) nearly doubled from 34% in 1958 to 67% in
1969.45
In 1970, a series of interviews with over fifty citizens of Heidelberg in West
Germany was published. The interviewees ranged from high school students to Catholic
priests, college students, and one seventy-year-old former soldier. In one interview with
two teenage boys, the deficiency of Heidelberg’s education of its students on National
Socialism and the Third Reich becomes clear. One boy complained that he had not been
taught anything about that period of his nation’s history while the other boy explained
that he was being taught quite a lot about it. This, however, he attributed to having a
young teacher who showed “movies of the Third Reich and [told the students] what
different people had to say about them [the films], Jews and so on, people who were
interviewed after they’d seen them.”46 Apparently this teacher was interested in giving
his students a fairly comprehensive lesson about the Nazis; the student explained that his
class had, chronologically, just reached Hitler’s seizure of power in their studies.
Another high school student described a similar experience at her school. She explained
that her teacher “attached great importance to it [learning about National Socialism].”47
Of course, both teachers were fairly young, probably in the same age range as most of the
68ers.
The conflict begun by the 1960s’young adults demanding an open dialogue with
the past filtered down into the high schools. However, many West Germans, including
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some of these young adults, desired a break with the past, a drawing line where they
could stop discussing the Third Reich. A twenty-year-old college student explained that
she was exposed to education about the Nazis quite frequently, but described a sterile
atmosphere. “When, for example, someone delivered a report about the concentration
camps or about the Jewish question, no one was allowed to express any opinion.”48 She
complained that people were tired of talking about it. In fact, a number of people
interviewed both denounced the rise of neo-fascism (in the guise of the NPD)49 and then
deplored being made to suffer a burden of guilt. One twenty-seven-year-old college
student blamed his parents for being too submissive to the Nazis and thereby allowing the
atrocities to happen, but later declared that Germans had dwelt too long on the past. He
complained of what he called “this eternal breast-beating.”50 There was a strange
dichotomy between wanting to learn more about the National Socialist period and yet
wanting to talk about it less. One sixty-four-year-old professor of law observed the
change in how his college students related to Germany’s National Socialist past and what
their views were at the time of the interview in the late 1960s:
Immediately after the War our typical student was only
relatively intelligent but always conscientious…. He
regarded the National Socialist period as a historical fact
that lay behind him, for which perhaps our fathers were
responsible but to which he himself had not been
committed. He studied, he tried to secure a successful
future by getting good marks in his courses and
examinations. It was only around 1960 that a change
occurred and now the National Socialist period is again
becoming a burning issue. Now incisive questions are
48
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raised: “What actually happened? How did people
behave?” I regard this as a very good sign.51
However, this interest seemed to be concentrated in predominantly universities with the
majority of West Germans either unconcerned with or apathetic about their own history.
This issue of apathy came from a sense of bearing a burden they did not own. Most
young West Germans felt disconnected from a National Socialist past that they saw as
unfairly dominating their present. The law professor explained that many of his students
disagreed with continued reparations payments to Israel and were tired of carrying around
eternal guilt.52 While some members of the Nachkriegsgeneration wished, like many of
their parents, to leave the past behind, the 68ers pressed forward with their confrontation.
The locus of this move to address the National Socialist past originally lay in West Berlin
with the student activists of the New Left who strove to unearth corruption in their
government and change their society.
Intellectuals and the Student Protestors
The students who made up a large part of the protest movements in West
Germany in the 1960s were leftists opposed to the materialism of capitalism as well as
the allegedly imperialist policies of capitalist nations such as the United States. They
feared increasing authoritarianism that appeared to be taking over the government of the
Federal Republic. The Great Coalition of the Christian Democrats and the Social
Democrats in November 1966 gave the new organization ninety percent of the seats in
the Bundestag53 and was led by Kurt Georg Kiesinger, a former National Socialist. With
the governing coalition very close to holding complete control over parliament, many
51
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student activists joined the so-called Außerparlamentarische Opposition54 (APO) in an
attempt to establish a political counterweight to the Great Coalition. Of course, such
seemingly authoritarian measures as the Notstandgesetzte were immediately denounced
by the protestors as “Nazi”. The National Socialist past permeated the 1960s’ Federal
Republic during the student protests, partly for the authoritarian measures proposed by
the West German government and partly for the number of former Nazis not only left
over from Adenauer’s government, but those who (like Kiesinger) were quickly rising to
greater power in the new democratic government. To the 68ers, already alienated from
silent parents unwilling to discuss their Nazi past, all of this seemed hypocritical and
undemocratic. And to make matters worse, one of the largest publishing concerns in
West Germany, Springer Verlag, was obviously biased against the students. Axel
Springer’s newspapers regularly indulged in yellow journalism, denouncing the
protestors and labeling their leaders (like Rudi Dutschke) communists, something that
was a highly sensitive subject especially in the “island” of West Berlin.
Fear of communism was a thread that ran through West Germany, and especially
West Berlin. But starting in the 1960s with students and others protesting against the
government, these became areas fearful of the words Nazi and fascist as well. These
became words of denouncement, and for the left-wing activists, words of political and
social anathema. It seemed that everywhere one looked in local or national government
there were former Nazis, deemed successfully denazified by the occupation powers, and
others who managed to escape denouncement altogether until exposed by the 68ers.
West Berlin was an area extremely politically sensitive. The students, centered
mainly in the Free University of Berlin, initially sought a change in their traditional
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universities’ structures and policies, things they saw as confining and outdated. The Free
University was itself established as a protest to the communist dominated Humboldt
University in the Soviet controlled sector of Berlin in 1948. Called the “Berlin Model”,
this new university was established on a principle of participation by students and
cooperation between students and faculty.55 The students of the Free University of Berlin
were introduced to a more democratic system that encouraged the students to speak their
minds in open forums. But by 1960, even this open and democratic institution was
falling back on older, more authoritarian ways when it seemed that fewer and fewer
students were interested in participating in politics. The administration and faculty seized
the opportunity to regain and monopolize control of the university. The “Berlin Model”
of an open and fully democratic university had failed and because of this, up and coming
student leaders felt frustrated and betrayed by the one system in which they should have
had full participation.56
As in the United States and France in the 1960s, anti-government protest
movements often sprang from the fertile soils of universities. West German student
leaders often became politically active since there were many university and student
organizations affiliated with political parties; organizations such as the Ring ChristlichDemokratischer Studenten (RCDS) which was an affiliate of the CDU, or the
Sozialdemokratischer Hochschulbund (SHB) which was affiliated with the Social
Democrats.57 However, it was a non-affiliated group, the Sozialistischer Deutscher
Studentenbund (SDS),58 that was often in the middle of or behind many of the protests.
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The SDS began, like the SHB, as a student affiliate of the Social Democratic Party, but
the relationship soured in 1959 when the political party officially renounced Marxism and
began to move more center than left. The SDS continued in what the Social Democrats
considered to be too radically leftist a direction.59 The most outspoken ideologue of the
SDS, Rudi Dutschke, stressed the use of open confrontation with not only the university
but the government as well. Eventually calling more and more for violence, Dutschke
explained that his fellow students would, “through systematic, controlled and limited
confrontations with the power structure and imperialism in West Berlin…force the
representative ‘democracy’ to show openly its class character, its authoritarian nature
[and] force it to expose itself as a ‘dictatorship of force.’”60 Another irony of the 68ers
lay in Dutschke’s campaign for violence against the state: his were the same words and
the same tactics used by the National Socialists in the early 1930s when they took
advantage of the democracy of the Weimar Republic and destroyed it. This would not be
the last irony, since a number of 68ers would also turn to violent anti-Semitism.
Influenced greatly by Herbert Marcuse (Critique of Pure Tolerance) and Frantz
Fanon (The Wretched of the Earth), both left-wing intellectuals who advocated that the
oppressed use violence to overthrow their oppressors, Dutschke and others (following the
examples of such left-wing revolutionaries as Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara) resorted
to direct action against those they deemed to be their oppressors.61 It was no surprise
then that Dutschke’s followers demonstrated in front of the publishing houses of his
nemesis, Axel Springer, after the student leader was shot in April 1968.
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Dutschke and the other student activists were also strongly influenced by the
social and philosophical theories of the Frankfurt School of Social Research. The
foundation of the student protest movement in West Germany in the 1960s was a
seemingly generalized anti-authoritarianism, described by activist Rudi Dutschke:
“Today no abstract theory holds us together; instead, it is the existential disgust with a
society which chatters about freedom while subtly and brutally oppressing the immediate
interests and needs of individuals and the people fighting for their socio-economic
emancipation.”62 Dutschke, and other members of the SDS, did absorb the theories of the
Frankfurt School, however. The Frankfurt School of Social Research produced the
Critical Theory, developed by Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Another
influential member of the school, Jürgen Habermas, was a student of Adorno and
Horkheimer. Habermas, in a 1977 interview, described his shock as a young college
student when he discovered that some of the most influential men of postwar Germany
had been Nazi supporters, “eminent men like Martin Heidegger and Carl Schmitt.” Both
men had delivered statements in support of the National Socialist regime. “The first
[Heidegger], as chancellor of the University of Freiburg, had welcomed the Nazis’
seizure of power and exalted its significance metaphysically, while the second [Schmitt]
had theoretically vindicated that state which Hitler created.”63 But, perhaps the worst
crime was the fact that neither ever retracted those statements nor did they provide any
explanation for offering support to a criminal regime.
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The Critical Theory, asserted by 1960s’ West German intellectuals, was
concerned with Marxism and its supposed decline and with totalitarianism as evidenced
not only by the Third Reich but by the postwar Western societies as well. Horkheimer
wrote in the Critical Theory in the 1960s: “The Third Reich of which I am conscious
each waking hour of that part of my life which escaped it, historically was no absurdity,
but instead a signal of the totalitarianism which appears to be more and more timely even
on this side of the Iron Curtain.”64 The Frankfurt School framed its Critical Theory in the
Dialectic of the Enlightenment, also written by Adorno and Horkheimer. The Dialectic
of the Enlightenment, in contrast to popular historical theory of the time that claimed that
the Third Reich was an inevitability that grew out of a thread of barbarity underlying
German history, proposed instead that the Third Reich was the natural outgrowth of the
“mathematical formalism” of the Enlightenment. Adorno and Horkheimer defined the
Enlightenment as “the reduction of the total universe to the mere stuff for domination by
man, himself conceived as an abstract, immaterial identity of pure thought.”65 Therefore,
any society which participated in the Enlightenment or attempted to socially engineer a
utopia would experience an inevitable progression toward totalitarianism, the prime
example being the Third Reich of Germany.
The Frankfurt School was very influential in forming the sociological base of
such student groups as the SDS. Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas, as Marxist
sociologists, believed that West Germany was in danger of succumbing to the
Kulturindustrie (culture industry) of the United States and was becoming an autoritärer
Staat (authoritarian state). The Frankfurt School’s philosophy was anti-capitalist and
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stated that “the individual in a capitalist society [is] a subconsciously ‘uniformed’ massman, lacking autonomy and thus capable of authoritarian surrender to powers which
require large numbers of consumers.”66 The Frankfurt School believed that materialism
forced on the individual would turn him into a consumerist slave ignorant of not only his
enslavement but also of the actions of his government.
Ethically and morally speaking, Habermas believed that the Germans could not
legitimately embrace their new democracy (and perhaps did not deserve it) because they
did nothing to rid themselves of the totalitarianism of the Third Reich. National
Socialism was taken from the Germans; they did not give it up. And because there was
no “explosive act,” no “spontaneous sweeping away”, everything in Germany was tainted
with Nazism.67 Because of this, the parents’ generation did not deserve the new
democracy and was not actually creating one. At no time did they fight against the
criminal regime; therefore, so many elements of that criminal regime permeated the socalled new Germany. This was the legacy handed down to the Nachkriegsgeneration,
that of a tainted society. This was part of what the students believed they were struggling
against, what was taught to them by the Frankfurt School. The post-war generation
believed they were being forced to suffer the crimes to which their parents would not
admit.
From the Dialectic of the Enlightenment and the Critical Theory, the students
learned to relate everything to their nation’s National Socialist past. The Third Reich
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permeated nearly every aspect of their lives from their parents to their professors to their
politicians. The intellectuals of the Frankfurt School and authors such as Günter Grass
and Heinrich Böll taught them that the National Socialist past was not something that
could or should be ignored. If their protests were to be successful, they had to uncover
the past and make sure it was no longer neglected.
Authorship and the New Left
German authors, most notably Günter Grass and Heinrich Böll, began to publish
works that dealt with the issue of National Socialism beginning in 1959 and 1960.
Breaking away from the failed literary experiment of Kahlschlag and inner emigration,
these new works “offered a critical, essentially historical view of National Socialism
located within the wider spectrum of German militarism in the twentieth century.” Böll’s
1963 work, Ansichten eines Clowns, set the stage for the 68ers’ criticism of Nazis in their
democratic government by illustrating the ease with which former Nazis regained
affluence and influence in the new government and how they had retained aspects of
National Socialism.68 In the early 1960s, two major events took place that most likely
affected the choice of subject: the highly publicized arrest and trial of Adolf Eichmann
and the series of Auschwitz Trials. The Nazis were once again center stage and
impossible to ignore. German theater especially reflected this influence by breaking
away from the collective silence and producing a series of documentary dramas centered
on National Socialism, inspired by the Auschwitz Trials.69 Such social commentary
came from a variety of areas and addressed a range of topics, none more controversial
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than the proposed Notstandgesetzte. In 1966, Karl Jaspers published Wohin treibt die
Bundesrepublik? In this work, the philosopher called for an examination of the oligarchy
he believed to be dominating West German politics. He then proposed that if continued
unchecked, such an oligarchy could become a dictatorship and the Notstandgesetzte
(Emergency Laws) were a step in the same process that put the Nazis in total power in
1933.70 Student activists seized on this logic and a demonstration of approximately
20,000 strong marched in Frankfurt in October 1966 in protest against the
Notstandgesetzte. Many of the activists who marched against these Emergency Laws
were members of the German New Left.
The Neue Linke (New Left) was created by intellectuals, such as those of the
Frankfurt School, and radicals who disagreed with communism, sparked in part by the
violent policies of the Soviet Union with such countries as Hungary during its revolt in
1956. The New Left also broke away when many of the groups of the old Left renounced
Marxism in 1959. Intellectuals like Herbert Marcuse believed that because the people of
the working class were under the spell of capitalism, they had become, as the Frankfurt
School believed, “mass-men.” The New Left believed that the working class was
mesmerized, made passive by material abundance and consumer goods and therefore
incapable of breaking free on its own. The working class would not be able to free itself
without such intellectuals and radicals as those of the New Left to break the chains,
without whom there would be no proletariat uprising. The New Left also accused the old
Left of hidden authoritarianism and manipulating public opinion. This resounded with
students who experienced comparable situations in their universities and began to believe
that their government was not committed to the democracy it claimed to have
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established.71 For some of these students, the only way to affect the situation was no
longer through petitions and open forums, not when university rectors continuously
overturned any reforms agreed upon. The student New Left decided, instead, on a course
of Subversive Aktion (Subversive Action). The intention of Subversive Action, according
to member Rudi Dutschke, was to uncover hidden power structures in their society
through protests, demonstrations, and other planned situations; these would provoke a
violent, repressive response from the government and would thereby reveal the true
fascist nature of the regime.72
Dutschke, also a member of the SDS, participated in many protests and gave
many speeches in which he outlined the students’ goals. “As early as their statement of
‘The University in a Democratic Society’ in 1961 the SDS had advocated a university
that would train them to think critically and to act politically, which would result in more
democracy at the university and in the society.”73 These students saw their university as
a microcosm of their society and a basis for change. Until 1967, the student movement
remained small and closely confined to the universities. In June of 1967, the protests
against the Shah of Iran, sparked by his visit to Berlin, turned violent. At the end of May,
some six thousand students had protested the Shah in Munich without incident, but on 2
June three thousand Berlin students clashed with police and a twenty-six-year-old student
named Benno Ohnesorg was shot and killed. In the following days, nearly one hundred
thousand students would demonstrate across the Federal Republic in protest against
police brutality and in support of free speech and democracy.74
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A year earlier, the Kuratorium Notstand der Demokratie (Committee Against the
State of Emergency) was created to oppose nuclear weapons, U.S. actions in Vietnam,
and the Notstandgesetzte proposed by the West German government (a law that would
suspend personal freedoms in a time of emergency). When Ohnesorg was shot, this
proved to the Kuratorium that “uncontrolled executive power would use violence against
demonstrations in any future state of emergency.” Taking advantage of Ohnesorg’s
death, the Kuratorium distributed leaflets and held lectures that swayed a number of
university students to oppose the Notstandgesetzte.75 A year after the violence of the
Shah’s visit, the committee held a protest in Bonn (seat of the Federal Republic’s
parliament) and approximately 50,000 people demonstrated against the reading of the
Notstandgesetzte. The New York Times wrote that the “majority condemned the
emergency legislation as Nazi.”76 To the students, these laws were dangerously similar
to those that put Hitler in power in 1933 and revealed the hypocrisy of their government’s
dedication to democracy. The only concession gained by the Kuratorium was a slight
change in the legislation that would decrease the power of the executive branch in the
enactment of the laws. Otherwise, the Notstandgesetzte were passed intact on 30 May
1968.
The Press and the Protests
Another concern for the students was free speech and freedom of press,
something they saw as monopolized by Springer Verlag, “which controlled 78 percent of
the daily newspaper and magazine circulation of Berlin and nearly a third in West
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Germany.”77 Springer newspapers wrote daily against the students and other activists,
accusing them of being communists and even labeling Rudi Dutschke “Red Rudi.” For
the students, this was very similar to the Hugenberg-Konzern, the publishing concern of
industrialist Alfred Hugenberg, who had helped put Hitler in power in the 1930s. The
accusation of communism also turned the German public strongly against the activists.
The antagonism between the students and the Springer concern exploded in April 1968
with the attempted murder of Dutschke by a fascist named Josef Bachmann. Student
activists blamed Springer as the mastermind behind the attempt on Dutschke’s life and
attacked Springer offices across the Federal Republic. Over the following days of what
would be called the Easter Riots, thousands of students attacked Springer delivery vans,
clashed with police, and held protests in cities around West Germany. These riots were
the largest expression of student anger and frustration at a supposedly democratic system
apparently determined to keep them oppressed. The most obvious reason for this
oppression was, for the students, the influence of Nazis in an unbalanced government.
The political system in West Germany played a large role in the student protests
of the 1960s. After World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany, with the
Constitution of 1949, attempted to forestall the postwar political chaos of the Weimar
Republic by expanding the power of parliament and political parties at the expense of the
office of the president. A five percent rule was also introduced which reduced the
number of political parties represented in parliament. Increased parliamentary power,
coupled with the reduced number of parties, would give the Große Koalition incredible
political control from 1966 to 1969.78 To many student activists and political opponents
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of the SPD and the CDU, this looked frighteningly like the bid for power made by the
Nazis in the early 1930s.
It was not until the young anti-authoritarians of the New Left began to question
the previous generation about National Socialism that attempts to address and deal with
that part of Germany’s history became anything other than intermittent and singular. The
Nachkriegskinder were raised in a tense silence when it came to National Socialism.
Some parents did discuss the past, but such discussions were typically limited to the war
itself and personal suffering during and after. With the exception of singular issues such
as reparations, the Nazi generation did not discuss the atrocities committed by the regime
under which they had lived. Therefore, it was not until the Nachkriegskinder reached
university that many of the postwar generation began to learn more about the horrors of
National Socialism. The more they learned, the more they felt lied to by their parents.
Because of the horrific nature of their parents’ pasts, this postwar generation became very
active in opposing any and all forms of injustice, sometimes in controversial and
confrontational ways. They became extremely opposed to anything they considered
fascist. However, the student activists’ definition of fascism had been set by Das
Argument and other left-wing journals; fascism became “an extreme response of
capitalism to economic crises.”79 This link with capitalism would be crucial in the
protests of the 68ers as they demonstrated against the United States, against Israel, and
against their own government. They, as the New Left had taught them, linked capitalism
to National Socialism, making the government of the Federal Republic merely a
continuation of the Third Reich.
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The answering protests that accompanied American action in Vietnam held a
second significance for the West German student activists. For many in the Federal
Republic, the fact that Vietnam was tied to communism made the subject a delicate one
since West Germany was supposed to be a bulwark against communist encroachment
from the east. The student protests against the Vietnam War incited a heated conflict
between them and the Springer press concern that labeled them “reds.” The student
protests, however, were multilayered and not as simple as “communist.” Leaders like
Rudi Dutschke spoke of genocide in Indochina to incite the protestors but also because
the young New Left saw such protests as their especial responsibility as Germans to
oppose any actions related to fascism. “The Vietnam War was subject to the doublecoding that defined young Germans’ perceptions.”80 Most events of their day they
viewed as either stemming from the Nazi era or as throwbacks to Nazi policy. Any
authoritarian action was labeled fascist and therefore Nazi. It became a responsibility of
young West Germans to be anti-authoritarian in order to avoid repeating the crime of
acquiescence committed by their parents. Sometimes activists took this self-imposed
responsibility to extremes and, at times, used aggressive hyperbole. “In 1966, banners
were secretly placed on the memorial site entrance at the Dachau concentration camp
proclaiming, ‘Vietnam is the Auschwitz of America’ and ‘American leathernecks are
inhuman murderers like the SS.’”81 Such hyperbole did draw public attention as intended
but also served to relativize the Holocaust, erasing its uniqueness by linking it to other
events. Such historical relativism would be condemned as uncircumspect during the
Historikerstreit (Historians’ Debate) of the mid 1980s.
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Controversial protests, like the banners at Dachau, by the students and the New
Left made West Germans very uncomfortable. Anti-communism was the only acceptable
stance at the time since West Germany considered itself surrounded by communist
oppression. By the 1960s, West Berlin’s population had swelled due to an influx of
young people: young men seeking to escape mandatory military service (West Berlin’s
residents were exempt) and gays and other social non-conformists who sought the
freedom of experience in the city’s historically tolerant neighborhoods. Like Greenwich
Village in New York and the Haight-Ashbury in San Francisco, West Berlin in the 1960s
attracted a spectrum of non-conformists who often comprised the protestors and
demonstrators. West Berlin became a “radical-workshop stage.”82 The West Berlin
68ers believed in Marxism, but for them Marx didn’t have anything to do with the people
on the other side of the wall that shocked them when it was built in the early 1960s.
Rather, Marxism was the opposite of the United States and the opposite of National
Socialism.83 Marxism was a tool of their protest and Marxists revolutionaries such as
Rosa Luxemburg and Che Guevara were the objects of hero worship in West Berlin
among the student activists who carried placards with these faces on them at protests.
The conservative West German press used such images to paint the students as supporters
of East Germany and even spies which fed the near-hysterical anti-communism of some
West Berliners and led to more incidents of violence, not just between students and
police, but also with counter-demonstrators. When the student protestor, Ohnesorg, was
shot and killed by police during a demonstration in early June 1967, the violence
escalated. The activists blamed not only the police, but the Springer press concern and
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the government. “At an emotional meeting on the night of June 2 [the day Ohnesorg was
killed] of the German SDS (Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund), the future RAF
founder Gudrun Ensslin exclaimed ominously: ‘This fascist state means to kill us all….
Violence is the only answer to violence. This is the Auschwitz generation, and there’s no
arguing with them.’”84 The press served to polarize the situation by reporting
inaccuracies in favor of the police and the conservative politicians of the CDU
condemned the students for attempting to incite a riot and vowed to have all such student
activists removed from the universities.85 Student response was not immediate, but when
it did come the following year, it would shake a great many West Germans out of their
comfort zone.
Their Explosive Year
1968 was an explosive year in the Federal Republic of Germany and is the reason
why the activists of this generation are called 68ers. On 1 February, a demonstration
once again turned deadly when a right-wing extremist counter-protestor was killed in a
clash with anti-fascist protestors.86 That same month, students and intellectuals
participated in a “Springer Tribunal,” which declared the Springer press concern to be a
dangerous monopoly that deliberately incited violence against the students. As a result of
the so-called tribunal, Springer offices were attacked but suffered only minimal damage.
On 2 April 1968, members of the APO attacked two department stores in Frankfurt,
setting fires after closing time. Two of the future founders of the violent activist group
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Rote Armee Fraktion87 (RAF), Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin, were arrested and
charged with arson. That same month, a young right-wing extremist shot Rudi Dutschke,
one of the leaders of the APO and the SDS, in West Berlin. Dutschke survived the
attack, but protests exploded all over the Federal Republic. Violent confrontations
between police and demonstrators took place in front of Springer offices and activists
interfered with the delivery of Springer papers all over the country. For many of the
activists it was obvious that the authoritarian government and its fascist press were
targeting them the way the Nazis had targeted the Jews. “Since the Third Reich, the
object of attack has been switched: the hooked Jewish nose in [the infamous Nazi
weekly] Der Stürmer had been replaced in the cartoons in Bild and BZ88 by the beard of
the student, considered subhuman like a gorilla. The demand “Jews Out” prepared the
way for the gas chamber.”89 By equating themselves with the Jewish victims of the Nazi
genocide the students were placing themselves on a martyr’s pedestal, which in West
Germany could be an unassailable position. In short, it empowered them in the light of
their nation’s history and they felt themselves absolved of any guilt for continued
violence.
In May 1968, thousands of protestors marched on Bonn in opposition to the
Notstandgesetzte which were passed at the end of that month. In November, more
violent clashes between police and student protestors took place in West Berlin. Also in
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November 1968, twenty-nine-year-old Beate Klarsfeld slapped Chancellor Kiesinger in
the face and called him a Nazi on the stage at the CDU congress in West Berlin.90
Many of the resistors, as some of the student protestors began to call themselves,
followed the intellectual, Herbert Marcuse. Andreas Baader quoted Marcuse’s essay
“Repressive Tolerance” at his arson trial. In that essay, Marcuse denounced the
perversion of tolerance in advanced industrialized nations and advocated resistance, even
violent resistance, something the future members of the RAF internalized.91 However,
for many of the 68ers, the violence of 1968 and their failure to prevent the passage of the
Notstandgesetzte drastically reduced the momentum of the movement. The APO
disbanded in 1968 and even the splinter groups of the SDS likewise dissolved in early
1970.92 As a result, a few of the frustrated activists joined more extremist groups like the
RAF and enacted violence that culminated in the German Autumn of 1977 when the RAF
committed kidnapping and murder in the name of their cause.
Anti-Zionism and the 68ers
The student activists of the 1960s viewed themselves as champions of good
causes such as sexual liberation, women’s rights, and in 1967, the Palestinians. Prior to
the Arab-Israeli War, the young New Leftists were pro-Israel, most likely as a reflection
of the West Germany’s philo-Zionism. The Arab-Israeli War changed all of that with
images of Palestinians suffering under the violent oppression of invading Israelis.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the student generation began
to reject the blackout history that characterized the
underside of the official “Wiedergutmachung” [literally,
making up for], and many were morally outraged at the
inability of the previous generation to confront the horrors
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of Auschwitz. With the Six-Day-War, however, the
situation reversed itself: German conservatives now
embraced Israeli military success as a vindication of their
own wartime behavior and the tabloid press was so
unabashedly identified with this aspect of Israel, that the
student Left did an about face, now seeing Israel as the
imperialist aggressor and the Palestinians as the heroic
victims. By calling the Palestinians the “Jew’s Jew” the
mantel of guilt could be completely removed.93
For the young Leftists in West Germany, the Palestinians were transformed into Jews;
they became the victims of fascist imperialist aggression. By 1970, with the visit of the
Israeli foreign minister to Germany, the 68ers were anti-Zionist, describing Israel as a
“Zionist, economically and politically parasitic state.”94 Any number of reasons for this
change in position have been proposed: that the students were reflecting the buried antiSemitism of Nazi parents; that they had a desire to vilify Israel, thereby expunging some
of Germany’s guilt; or that because they were the Nachkriegskinder (postwar children),
they were innocent of Nazi guilt, including that of anti-Semitism, and as such were free
to condemn Israel without any moral or ethical constraints.95
Whatever the psychological reasons behind this rising anti-Zionism, some young
Leftists considered violence an acceptable form of protest against Israel. One of the more
extreme activists, Dieter Kunzelmann, saw it as his duty to resist the oppression of Israel
by force and consequently plotted a bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Berlin.
The bomb was set to explode on 9 November 1969 when over two hundred people would
be gathered in the Community Center to remember Kristallnacht. The bomb failed to
detonate. In a 2005 interview with die tagezeitung, Tilman Fichter (brother of Albert
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Fichter, the man who planted the bomb for Kunzelmann) described Kunzelmann and the
anti-Semitism that underlay this student activist’s motives. According to Fichter,
Kunzelmann promoted “anti-Semitism tout court,” rather than the analytical/intellectual
anti-Semitism of the rest of the New Left that was supposed to distinguish between “the
Jews in the diaspora and the State of Israel.”96 What is interesting is that Fichter tried to
make a distinction between what he saw as two different forms of the same prejudice, but
he never denied 68er anti-Semitism. For him, it was an intellectual, political issue that
required analysis and debate while Kunzelmann’s violent anti-Semitism was more
visceral. The other leftist activists of the student movement failed to discuss either the
failed bomb attack or Kunzelmann’s anti-Semitism, however. Fichter described the topic
as taboo:
It was taboo to say there could be something like antiSemitism on the Left. Because the Left had been a victim,
because it had suffered together with the Jews in the
concentration camps, it never thought it possible that this
problem could also exist in its own ranks. I [Fichter] was
severely criticized at the time, even by comrades I still
think highly of today. They said, “Tilman, you shouldn’t
make such a big thing of it. We can settle this internally.”
When I started discussing it openly with my article on antiSemitism I was treated like a bit of renegade, as if I were
eroding solidarity on the Left, and opening up a can of
worms that had to be cleared up among ourselves. But it
was never cleared up. That was the problem.97
Avoiding the issue, refusing to address the situation, and most especially indulging in
violent anti-Semitism, these were the exact things the 68ers accused their parents’
generation of doing and the irony did not stop with the 68ers ignoring the issue. Some of
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the activists eventually became anti-Semitic right-wing extremists; Horst Mahler, for
example.
Horst Mahler was a leftist activist who became associated with the violent protest
group called the Rote Armee Fraktion. When Andreas Baader was put on trial for the
Frankfurt department stores arson, Mahler was one of the lawyers who represented him.
Mahler continued to represent the RAF until his arrest in October 1970. He was arrested
based on an anonymous tip that labeled him as a member of the violent group. Mahler
was acquitted at his first trial but later convicted in 1973 for participation in armed
robberies and for being a founding member of the RAF. The RAF was classified as a
terrorist organization in the Federal Republic and membership was therefore illegal.
After the violence of the German Autumn of 1977, Mahler turned away from not only the
RAF, but from leftist activism.98 He was released from prison in 1980 and resumed his
legal practice with the help of former leftist comrade and future West German
Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder. Twenty years later, the former left-wing activist declared
that he had joined the NPD, Germany’s right-wing extremist party. Then Mahler began
to host retreats where right-wing extremists would plan the so-called “Fourth Reich”,
which was supposed to replace what the extremists believed to be an illegitimate
government forced on them by occupiers.99 Interviewed by the Times of London after
one of these neo-Nazi gatherings where he declared that the “Jews and their cult” would
be banned in the new Reich, Mahler opined that the protest of the 68ers was never against
the Nazi generation. Instead, he claimed that the protests were about opposing American
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imperialism only.100 In contrast to Mahler’s political about-face, other former 68ers drew
closer to the political center while still others became officials in the German
government. With the exception of some remaining extremists like Mahler, the 68ers, on
their long march through the institutions, became a part of the establishment; instead of
fighting the system, they became the system.
Social Change
Despite the public and often controversial attempts by the 68ers to change
conceptions of the past, there did not seem to be widespread support among the Germans
of the Federal Republic for them. Thanks in part to the reporting practices of Springer
journalists, the press portrayed the students as communists and this view was echoed in
the population. The label of communism was a dangerous one, most especially in the
“island” of West Berlin. This labeling probably prevented the efforts of the 68ers from
being more effective and extensive. There would be no breaking away from the past, no
drawing line. The Federal Republic of Germany, as a whole, would slowly alter its
perceptions of its National Socialist past in the 1960s. The victims of National Socialism
began to gain a greater voice in both literature and drama and the mid 1960s saw the
establishment of a number of concentration camp memorials.101 The Jews emerged to the
forefront of the lists of Nazi victims, helped in part by the 68ers; at least until the 1967
Arab-Israeli War. This war, in which Israel was seen by the West German activists as
imperialist aggressors, eliminated popular support for Israel among the students.
Suddenly the Palestinians had their cause taken up by the same anti-authoritarian anti100
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fascists that denounced Nazism in their West German government. In an interesting turn
of logic, the Israelis/Jews had become the Nazi-like oppressors of the poor Palestinians.
The 68ers began to decry the philo-Semitism and philo-Zionism of their denazified
parents. The APO and other student activist organizations became anti-Zionist and antiIsrael. The student generation’s anti-authoritarian, anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist stance
was stronger than their dedication to uncovering the truth about their parents’ National
Socialist past. By the 1970s, it appeared that the 68ers’ activism on behalf of the “truth
behind Nazism” was in fact a tool to discredit politicians, denounce government, and put
forward the cause of sexual liberation. The forward progress in National Socialist and
Holocaust history made by and because of the student activists called the 68ers was vital,
nonetheless. In pursuit of their agenda, they forced their fellow West Germans to
examine the Third Reich in greater detail and exposed a number of politicians for being
former Nazis.
The change effected by the protests of the 68ers was a breaking of what Hermann
Lübbe called the “communicative silence.” “The postwar generation of activists of 1967
and 1968 succeeded in disrupting the ‘communicative silencing’ of the Nazi past on a
broad scale and in calling up the repressed memory of Auschwitz in the collective
consciousness. This was a moral achievement, for which this generation alone would
have every reason to be proud.”102 The 68ers would continue their attack on this
collective silence in the 1990s with a controversial exhibition designed to expose the
truth about twenty million “innocent” Germans.

102

Brunkhorst, “The Tenacity of Utopia,” 131.

47

CHAPTER 3
THE MYTH OF THE “GOOD” WEHRMACHT: THE EXHIBITION OF THE 68ERS
AND THEIR CONTINUED CONFRONTATION WITH THE PAST

In the 1990s, the Hamburg Institute for Social Research (HIS) wanted to explore
violence in the 20th century. It launched a project entitled, Angesichts unseres
Jahrhunderts. Gewalt und Destruktivität im Zivilisationsprozeß. (In the Light of Our
Century: Violence and Destructiveness during the Twentieth Century). Under the
direction of Doctor Jan Philipp Reemtsma, the Institute developed an exhibition that was
to explore the role of the German military in National Socialist atrocities during the
Second World War. Opening in March 1995, Wehrmacht und NS-Verbrechen.
Wirklichen und Wirkungen einer kollektiven Gewalterfahrung (The Wehrmacht and Nazi
Crimes: Realities and Impacts of a Collective Experience) concentrated on the
Wehrmacht’s actions in Serbia, Byelorussia, and Stalingrad. Hannes Heer,103 a former
68er who designed and chaired the exhibition, wanted to illustrate the consciously
criminal nature of the actions of the Wehrmacht within the context of the war, which, the
Institute argued, was entirely criminal itself. Heer and the Institute treated the crimes
committed by the Wehrmacht as intentional rather than as unforeseen by-products of the
violence of war.104 By portraying the guilt of an organization long believed to be
innocent, the Wehrmacht exhibition “forced the issue of war crimes into German homes,
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often for the first time.”105 This would allow a new generation to confront their nation’s
past.
Myth-Making and the History of Innocence
Did the German Wehrmacht, during the Second World War, commit atrocities?
The position among historians originally favored the view of the "good" Wehrmacht.
The dispute over this has heated up in recent decades with more historians positing the
guilt of the German army. The debate raged over four major categories of Wehrmacht
participation in the atrocities committed by the Nazis on the eastern front: the army
needing and protesting in favor of the POW and Jewish labor force in their clothing,
armaments, and other manufacturing areas; the Wehrmacht taking no action, for or
against, but merely observing the murderous actions of the Einsatzgruppen and the
Special Order Police; troops rounding up victims and handing them over to the
Einsatzgruppen to be killed; or soldiers of the regular army capturing, enslaving,
torturing, and killing the people themselves.
Where did the legend of the “good” Wehrmacht originate? It must partly have
come from wartime propaganda such as the article published in the Hamburger
Fremdenblatt on 24 July 1942, in a report on the Jews in Holland:
Our correspondent in Amsterdam informs us that Dutch
citizens are showing a lively animosity toward the Jews.
The Jews have appealed to the Wehrmacht for protection.
Despite the eternal Jewish enmity, the Wehrmacht has
taken the Jews under its protection, and, at their request,
has transferred them to Germany, where they will be
employed according to their ability. To show their
gratitude for this generosity, the Jews have put their
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furniture and apartments at the disposal of the German
victims of the English bombings.106
As preposterous as this now sounds, this newspaper report probably allowed more than a
few Germans to rest a little easier when it came to stories of brutality from the front; and
most Germans would not wish to entertain such terrible thoughts of a husband, son, or
father in the Wehrmacht killing innocent civilians.
Another possible basis for the “good” Wehrmacht legend is the fact that the
Allied Tribunal, after the war, declared the General Staff and High Command not to be
criminal organizations according to Article 9 of the Charter for the International Military
Tribunal, unlike the SS107 and SD.108 Dr. Hans Laternser, counsel for the defense of the
General Staff and High Command, was also quite adept at refuting the statements
delivered by Nazi witnesses against the Wehrmacht. He convinced the court of the selfserving nature of the testimony of such high ranking Nazi officials as SS-Generals
Schellenberg109 and Ohlendorf.110 Laternser further declared that the army had played no
role in the exterminations; this despite the evidence delivered by Rudolf Höss on 5 April
1946 which stated that the transports that delivered the Soviet POWs, as well as the Jews,
to the camps were staffed and commanded by the Wehrmacht.111
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The Tribunal declared that the OKW112 (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) was, in
fact, merely “an aggregation of military men, a number of individuals who happen at a
given period of time to hold the high-ranking military positions.”113 Defining an army or
its command as a criminal organization held obvious problems for the International
Military Tribunal; too broad a definition and any military could be considered guilty. To
solve this problem, one of the judges suggested that the definition be based on that of
conspiracy. "To declare an organization criminal…all the Court needed to do was define
the organization as having a membership limited to those who knew the group was
criminal and who had joined voluntarily."114 Based on this narrower definition, the
Tribunal declared the OKW to be a non-criminal organization. The three Western Allied
judges overruled the dissenting Soviet judge in this decision. The Judgment then went on
to censure the brutal actions of the General Staff and High Command of the Wehrmacht
and, basically, accuse them of conduct unbecoming officers:
When it suits their defense they say they had to obey; when
confronted with Hitler’s brutal crimes, which are shown to
have been within their general knowledge, they say they
disobeyed. The truth is they actively participated in all
these crimes, or sat silent and acquiescent, witnessing the
commission of crimes on a scale larger and more shocking
than the world has ever had the misfortune to know.115
Reprimanding someone does not have nearly the same effect as a conviction by a court of
law. By declaring the General Staff and High Command of the Wehrmacht non-
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criminals and by dismissing the commanders with only a dressing down, the Tribunal in
effect released the whole of the Wehrmacht from complicity in and guilt for the crimes
against humanity planned and perpetrated by the Third Reich. This not-guilty verdict
placed the Wehrmacht in a category closer to that of victims; they had successfully
presented themselves as unwilling, order-following pawns, the typical defense at
Nuremberg. Once that happened, it was left to historians to illustrate the guilt of the
common Wehrmacht soldier in World War II.
According to one argument in favor of the "good" Wehrmacht, they were not
guilty of crimes against humanity because they tried to save the Jews and Soviet POWs
for their labor force. Their motives here, while admittedly not altruistic, were still not in
opposition to the murderous policies of the Third Reich. The debate following the Polish
campaign of 1939 was between the Attritionists and the Productionists. The Attritionists
such as Himmler, Heydrich, and the SS, wanted to solve the Jewish problem by leaving
the Jews to die from malnutrition, starvation, and disease. The Productionists, who were
mainly Wehrmacht commanders, saw the Jews as labor and even skilled labor, who could
aid the German war effort. They would use this same argument concerning the 5.7
million Soviet POWs (of which only 2.4 million survived116) the Wehrmacht captured
after Operation Barbarossa in 1941.
Productionists such as General von Ginant, the commander of the Wehrmacht in
the Government-General (Poland), protested the removal of the Jews working in German
army industry. In a memorandum to the OKW dated 18 September 1942, von Ginant
listed areas of production in which 25% to 100% of the laborers were Jewish. He
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estimated that out of roughly one million industrial workers in occupied Poland, 300,000
were Jewish and a third of those were skilled workers. Von Ginant hoped to impress
upon his commanders in the Wehrmacht the necessity of stopping the immediate removal
of his Jewish workforce. He argued that military industry would suffer from a drastic
reduction of labor, including skilled labor, which would cost precious time in training
replacement personnel. He suggested that the removal of the Jews be carried out locally,
step by step. "The general policy will be to eliminate the Jews from work as quickly as
possible without harming work of military importance."117 General von Ginant did not
protest the killing of the Jews and he was not resistant to the removal of them from his
workforce, he only took exception to the speediness of their withdrawal.
By 1944, those Jewish workers had been replaced with approximately two million
prisoners of war who took positions in such army industries as “armaments and
munitions in flagrant violation of the Hague and Geneva conventions, which stipulated
that no war prisoners could be employed in such tasks."118 The Russian children
encountered by the Wehrmacht were not spared either. They were rounded up by the
thousands to be shipped to the Reich in order to fill a need for apprentices. Alfred
Rosenberg’s119 office wrote a memorandum in June 1944 about this practice along the
eastern front. “Army Group Center intends to apprehend forty to fifty thousand youths
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from the age of 10 to 14…and transport them to the Reich."120 Of especial note, in the
memorandum from the Political Section of Wehrmacht headquarters in June 1944 on this
action is the statement that the idea originated in the Ninth Army.121 Wehrmacht
commanders were, especially in 1944, active in devising ways of obtaining the slave
labor they craved. This Heuaktion (Hay Action) was also intended as a racial measure in
that it was “not only aimed at preventing a direct reinforcement of the enemy’s strength
but also as a reduction of his biological potentialities."122 The document mentioned
propaganda to be used in support of the action entitled “Reich Aid to White Russian
Children, Protection Against the Partisans,” as well as a similar action under way within
another army group, which was also pressing acceptable teenage Russian boys into
service in the SS.123
Some historians, and most former soldiers, argued that the Wehrmacht did not
take part in the killings along the eastern front in World War II. They claim that the army
itself took no action, for or against the slaughter; that they merely observed the
murderous actions of the Einsatzgruppen, the Special Order Police, and other killing
squads. In Poland in 1940, Walther von Brauchitsch (Commander in Chief of the
German Army at the time) was concerned that the Wehrmacht was suffering lapses in
discipline due to the exterminations carried out by the Einsatzgruppen. As occupiers, he
wanted the army's reputation among the Poles to be secure. Von Brauchitsch was also
worried about the negative effects observation of the killings was having on his men.
"We need not mention again the unhappy role played by the Wehrmacht, forced to be a
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passive witness to these crimes."124 It is interesting to note that he used the word
"crimes," a general term for dissenting Wehrmacht commanders to use in reference to the
Einsatzgruppen's actions. This is not to say that von Brauchitsch or the other army
commanders were against the murders. Rather, they were against the way the people
were being killed and the ill effects it was having on the troops and the population. "The
methods and means of slaughter employed are most damaging [for us], complicating the
problem, and making matters far worse than they might have been if a sensible and
systematic course of action had been taken."125 Von Brauchitsch argued against the
brutal methods employed in Poland out of apprehension that it was providing the enemy
with easy propaganda, giving the Poles a reason to protect the Jews, and would result in
lower moral standards of "the most valuable German human material."126 As typical with
such protests from the Wehrmacht, he never raised objections to the murders themselves.
Then, in May 1941, the leaders of the Wehrmacht met with the RSHA
(Reichssicherheitshauptamt, the Reich Security Main Office) to discuss the imminent
invasion of the USSR, the Criminal Orders127 and to negotiate Einsatzgruppen functions
along the eastern front in the Soviet Union. With von Brauchitsch's earlier objections in
mind, the Wehrmacht agreed to cooperate in the ideological war under the stipulation that
the executions of the "enemies" be carried out in a more unobtrusive manner.128
The Criminal Orders, which were discussed at the meeting, carried four sets of
instructions to the Wehrmacht commanders and the SS. Part one regulated the
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Einsatzgruppen and gave them the freedom to operate directly behind the front lines.
Part two, Die Einschränkung der Kriegsgerichtsbarkeit (the Curtailment of Military
Jurisdiction), made it legal to shoot any and all persons suspected of guerrilla activities.
It also ordered that if no suspect could be located, then the local civilians were to bear the
brunt of the reprisals. The third part of the Criminal Orders was the infamous
Kommissarbefehl129 that ordered that all Soviet political commissars be taken prisoner
and executed immediately. The last part of the Criminal Orders consisted of the
"Guidelines for the Conduct of the Troops in Russia." This part of the orders demanded
the annihilation of any and all forms of resistance, especially that from "Bolshevik
agitators, guerrillas, saboteurs and Jews."130 A further order was given by Reichenau on
10 October 1941 which made perfectly clear his intentions regarding Jews: "the soldier
must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman
Jewry."131 What action was taken in dissent by OKW leaders took the form of
supplemental orders attached to the Criminal Orders. Von Brauchitsch issued one such
supplemental order on 24 May 1941, prior to Operation Barbarossa.
Criminal acts of a minor nature are, always in accordance
with the combat situation, to be punished according to
detailed orders from an officer (if possible, a post
commander) by resorting to provisional measures (for
instance), temporary detention at reduced rations, roping-up
on a tree, assignment to labour). …It must not come to it
that the individual soldier commits or omits any act he
thinks proper toward the indigenous population; he must
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rather feel that in every case he is bound by the orders of
his officers.132
First and foremost, von Brauchitsch was worried about threats to the discipline of his
troops, not humanitarian issues regarding the systematic slaughter of civilians. "Issuing
vague supplemental orders was the same method the army used during the Polish
campaign to weaken Hitler's orders that soldiers not be punished for any offensives
against Jews."133 Von Brauchitsch's supplement to the Kommissarbefehl was as vague as
it needed to be in order to prevent Hitler dismissing it. It, like many such supplemental
orders, was open to any number of personal interpretations by the officers to whom it was
issued and who, in turn, enforced it or not among their men.
Despite this one concession, the executions were still public enough for rumors of
them to circulate within the Reich itself and for soldiers to view them and comment in
letters and diaries. After the Nazi press published pictures of an alleged Soviet bloodbath
in East Prussia, a 6 November 1944 report to the Stuttgart SD recounted local statements
and remarks spurred by the anti-Soviet government propaganda.
What motive does the leadership have in publishing
pictures like those in the NS-Kurier on Saturday? They
must surely realize that every intelligent person, upon
seeing these victims, will immediately think of the
atrocities we have committed on enemy soil, yes even in
Germany. Did we not slaughter the Jews by the thousands?
Don't soldiers repeatedly tell of Jews who had to dig their
own graves in Poland? And what did we do with the Jews
who were in the KZ [concentration camp] in Alsace? After
all, Jews are also human. We have only shown the enemy
what they can do with us should they win.134
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The German public as far from the front lines as southwestern Germany knew what their
troops were doing the east. Even more heinously, some executions became little more
than freakish side shows, spectacles intended to entertain the troops in the area. One such
event took place in Zhitomir in Ukraine in August 1941 as described by a Wehrmacht
soldier present. “One day a Wehrmacht vehicle drove through Zhitomir with a
megaphone. Over the loudspeaker we were informed…that at a certain time that day
Jews would be shot in the market-place."135 What followed was a sadistic show of
beatings and murder for the benefit of the troops and, no doubt, the pleasure of the men
of the SS-Einsatzgruppen. Far from being passively entertained, some Wehrmacht
soldiers even joined the slaughter. “One member of an Einsatzgruppen (mobile killing
squad) claimed after the war that ‘on some occasions members of the Wehrmacht took
the carbines out of our hands and took our place in the firing-squad."136 Then in August
1942, Hitler issued another order intended to contain the "bandit" problem along the
eastern front. "The Chief of the Army General Staff is solely responsible for action
against bandits in operational areas. …There must be no German in the area threatened
by bandits who is not engaged, actively or passively, in the fight against them."137 The
definition of bandit was left to the discretion of the commander interpreting it, but usually
meant partisans, Jews, and any civilian suspected of anti-German activity. It also left no
doubt that no one would be allowed to disobey said order.
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Another facet of the argument for the "good" Wehrmacht is the myth of animosity
between the army and Himmler's SS. Largely it has been the lukewarm attempts at
challenging the brutal actions of the Einsatzgruppen in Poland and early in the Russian
campaign by a couple of OKW leaders, and later, the harsh measures taken by the SS to
discourage army deserters, that has provided support for this view. Nevertheless, the
simple fact is that without the cooperation of the Wehrmacht the Einsatzgruppen would
not have been able to kill the number of people that they did. There was actually such a
high level of cooperation between the army and Himmler's SS that what regularly
occurred was the Wehrmacht's participation in the collection of Russians (most of whom
were civilians) to give to the SS for execution. In other instances, the SS would assist the
Wehrmacht in army operations. In an Einsatzgruppen Activity and Situation Report, it
was recorded that "a Kommando of the Security Police and the SD consisting of sixty
men was put at the disposal of the 87th Division for use against Russian Cavalry."138
Initially, the Wehrmacht turned a disinterested eye to the "eliminations" performed by the
Einsatzgruppen, but very shortly, soldiers from the regular army were participating in the
executions. Around September 1941, local army commanders learned that twenty-one
German soldiers had been shot in Topala, Moldavia (at the time, a part of the Ukraine).
"As a reprisal two thousand one hundred Jews and Gypsies were killed solely by the
Wehrmacht."139 There are reports from numerous other such actions taken in revenge by
the army.
Some historians argue that because the troops were so far from the ideological
center of the Third Reich, the commanders of individual divisions could and frequently
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did dissent by ignoring the Kommissarbefehl. There can be little doubt, and there is
some evidence to support, that not every commander followed the Criminal Orders in the
same way. Such variance was built into the orders themselves. They were left
purposefully vague enough to encourage Wehrmacht commanders to interpret them
themselves based on the ideology in which they had been indoctrinated. This could
conceivably have allowed some commanders to disregard such orders, as Jay Baird
pointed out in his book, Nazi War Propaganda:
As a general rule, the farther one traveled from Hitler's
headquarters, the more humane were the Army directives
regarding the treatment of the Russian population. Indeed,
many field commanders issued orders that the Russians
were to be treated as Allies. Some went so far as to
declare, "Whoever among the indigenous population
participates in the struggle against Bolshevism…is not our
enemy but our fellow-fighter and fellow-worker in the
struggle against the world-foe."140
Unfortunately, the possibility of a large number of Wehrmacht commanders issuing
orders openly contradictory to those given by the OKW or Hitler or simply ignoring the
ones received is highly unlikely. Those commanders would have been committing
blatant treason and executed for it immediately. Manneszucht (military discipline) was
the mandate of the Wehrmacht and anything that interfered with it was dealt with
decisively. "Desertion and subversion were regarded as particularly serious offenses
insofar as they threatened discipline among the troops. These crimes were thus
prosecuted relentlessly; and they occasioned most of the death sentences that were
imposed by German courts martial during the Second World War."141 Whether the

140

Jay W. Baird, The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945 (Minneapolis, MN: University
of Minneapolis Press, 1974), 159.
141
Birgit Beck, "Sexual Violence and Its Prosecution by Courts Martial of the Wehrmacht," in A World at
Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937-1945; ed. Roger Chickering, Stig Förster,

60

troops followed the Criminal Orders out of agreement with the ideology or from fear of
punishment, they followed the orders. Any sizable amount of disobedience by the
military along the eastern front, as suggested by Baird, would not have gone unnoticed
and unpunished.
Secondly, such an order would and could never have included Jews. Since the
invasion of Poland in the autumn of 1939, treatment of any and all Jews encountered by
the Germans, whether by the Wehrmacht or the SS, was intentionally and ideologically
brutal. And third, the order quoted by Baird is dated 14 March 1943, nearly two years
after the invasion of the Soviet Union. To give the order the proper weight it must be
placed in its context within the war. In September 1942, during the Battle of Stalingrad,
the Wehrmacht was unexpectedly tied down within the city by snipers and other Soviet
soldiers and guerrillas, and was split in two when Hitler sent a sizable portion of the army
south to the Caucasus with the intention of capturing the oil fields there. In early
November 1942, the Western Allies were victorious at El Alamein. The Soviet
counteroffensive at Stalingrad was launched on 19 November 1942 and in very early
January of 1943 the Germans were forced to withdraw from the Caucasus after overextending their supply lines. The United States began their bombing raid on Germany
proper on 27 January 1943 and the vital Soviet victory at Kursk was in early February
1943. Around the time Baird's order was given, the Wehrmacht was engaging the Red
Army at Kharkov.142 Kharkov, or Kharkiv, located in eastern Ukraine, was a territory
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known to have had German sympathizers (prior to Generalplan Ost143). The order
quoted by Baird was most likely given out of the desire not to alienate further a people
(Hilfswilliger144) who had helped the German army in the past and a need for cooperation
from as much of the local population as possible to ensure fewer distractions from the
battle, if not assistance against the Soviets. When placed in context, the order Baird
quoted that he suggested exonerated Wehrmacht commanders appears as yet another
political and calculated move to ensure German victory over the Soviet Union.
In fact, the typical German soldier invading the Soviet Union in 1941 viewed
ruthlessness toward the Russians as either deserved or necessary. One lieutenant in the
Wehrmacht stationed in Russia wrote in his journal about a Russian prisoner who burned
himself on the camp stove. The injured man was denied medical attention and left
outside in November in -20° C weather to die in the snow until another Russian prisoner
of war wrapped him in a cloak and carried the man back to the POW camp. The
lieutenant then commented in his journal:
But one should always remember, when reading this, that
200,000 German soldiers died in Siberia in the Great War
[World War I]. Perhaps many more suffered even more
painfully than this Russian who, after all, is only one of
many. Russia, a land of cruelty, will likewise be handled
cruelly.145
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The young man's words echo with the justification and ideology of the regime he served
and its Wehrmacht. The Russians were numerous, barbarous Untermenschen who
deserved to be eliminated by whatever means necessary to secure the future of the Third
Reich and avenge the Great War. These are not the words of a dissenter.
The International Military Tribunal dismissed the case against the Wehrmacht at
Nuremberg. It declared the German army to be a non-criminal organization and was
therefore innocent of crimes against humanity. This verdict, as well as the self-serving
accounts written by Wehrmacht commanders after the war, has provided the foundation
for the myth of the "good" Wehrmacht. The supplemental orders to the Criminal Orders
issued by such high ranking OKW leaders as von Brauchitsch have, for some historians,
painted a picture of regular soldiers trapped by a ruthless, murderous regime with which
they had nothing in common. The truth, as far as it can be known, is that the Wehrmacht
in World War II was not only complicit in the atrocities committed along the eastern
front but perpetrated them as well. It employed millions of slaves in its industries, some
of whom it actively sought out. Its troops stood patiently by and watched as the SS and
SD slaughtered thousands in Poland and Russia. Finally, the soldiers of the Wehrmacht
captured, starved, and killed untold numbers of people along the German eastern front in
the Second World War.
Myth Confronted
The esoteric debate among historians over the guilt of the Wehrmacht has been all
but decided. Nevertheless, the German people have, for the last fifty years, been largely
convinced of the innocence of the nearly twenty million men who served Hitler on the
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front lines. It took a highly controversial photographic exhibition to shatter, publicly, the
myth of the good Wehrmacht.
Produced and hosted by the Hamburg Institute for Social Research, this itinerant
exhibition was launched in 1995. It was primarily a photographic display of atrocities
carried out on the German eastern front during the Second World War. The purpose of
the exhibition was to explore the war of extermination carried out by the Nazis; this
meant exposing the guilt of the last bastion of German innocence during the National
Socialist period, the Wehrmacht. During the 1950s, the focus of National Socialist
history was on the guilt of the government bureaucrats of the Third Reich, the most
visible of whom were tried at Nuremberg. In the 1960s and 1970s, with the 68er revolts,
the focus of National Socialist history turned from relativizing that history to the
collective guilt of the Nazi generation. In the 1980s, the debate on National Socialist
history was whether the Holocaust was a singular, unique event or was Stalinist cruelty
an equivalent. Beginning in the 1990s with this controversial exhibition, the focus of
National Socialist history was on the guilt of the “common man.”
The Wehrmacht exhibition, as part of the larger research project, “In Light of Our
Century: Violence and Destructiveness during the Twentieth Century,” sought to expose
the truth about the average German soldier in Hitler’s aggressive and criminal war on the
Soviet Union and Europe. It presented photographic evidence, often taken by the soldiers
themselves, of the Wehrmacht’s participation in the Holocaust. The HIS sought to
overturn the misconception of the innocent German infantryman had held sway over the
German public since the end of the war.
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After the Second World War, the necessity of rebuilding a destroyed Germany
took precedent over understanding and addressing German guilt. Every accusation of
German guilt had been carefully balanced with descriptions of German suffering or, as in
the 1960s, German contrition (i.e., reparations and Holocaust memorials).
A variety of factors combined to produce the uneasy and
faltering processes of confronting the past in the West [of
Germany], which in the end amounted to a pious public
confession of collective responsibility for acts which had
been committed, in the passive voice, on the soil of
Germany, in the name of the German people, but
apparently not by any (or many) members of the German
people.146
Until the 68ers revolted against this repression, West German history operated under a
thin veneer of contrition that covered a careful balancing act. Many in the Federal
Republic, most especially those of the war generation, balanced guilt for the Nazi regime
and its atrocities with stories and images of German suffering during the war and after.
Nearly thirty years after their initial revolt, the 68ers of the Nachkriegsgeneration once
again mounted a campaign to confront the past.
In 1994, the year before the Wehrmacht exhibition, the city of Wülfrath
presented an exhibition on the hardships of the immediate postwar years, entitled Zeichen
der Not (Times of Misery). Local citizens were asked to bring in items from 1945 to
1948. Those who had lived through that time were asked to come and share their
experiences. They were also asked to compare and contrast the postwar years with the
war years. For many of these people, the war was still too painful to discuss in any great
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detail.147 The 68ers had managed to awaken Germany, but silence was still the mandate
of a number of individuals of the war generation. However, the German public faced
reminders of National Socialism at every anniversary, read memoirs and scholarly books,
watched documentaries and films, and attended a number of exhibitions. The result of
this, according to German literary editor, Sigrid Loffler, is that “Europe is at a standstill
and looking back. Grandchildren are writing about what happened to their grandparents,
using diaries and reminiscences. They’re relaxed, not personally involved like the
generation of ’68, but they’re interested. The Holocaust is the negative founding myth of
the new, unified Europe. We have to discuss the horrible stories of the 20th century.”148
The Wehrmachtsausstellung (Wehrmacht exhibition), as it came to be called, ran
for four and a half years before succumbing to controversy over the accuracy of some of
the photographs as well as the overall presentation of the images, some of which had no
accompanying text. This first exhibition was dismantled, reorganized, and re-presented a
few years later under the new title, Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des
Vernichtungskrieges 1941-1944 (Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a
War of Annihilation, 1941-1944). “The information presented at this exhibition has a
completely different emotional force than other exhibitions which deal with the Nazi
Period. This force is directed at the families. This potentially concerns everyone.”149
According to Reemstma, the intention of both exhibitions, aside from documenting
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criminal acts, was to illustrate to the German people just how comprehensive was the
guilt for the Holocaust
Reemstma, the director of the Hamburg Institute for Social Research, declared his
Institute’s desire to impart to the visitor, through the photographs, a sense of being a
contemporary witness. He wanted people, within the context of the larger research
project, to ask themselves, “how did it—not only through National Socialism—come to
this immense demarcation of destruction?”150 As Reemtsma repeatedly explained, the
Wehrmacht exhibition was not aimed at influencing the perceptions of historians who had
known of and studied the Wehrmacht’s guilt for decades. Rather, the Institute sought to
challenge the perceptions of the German public, those who fought in the Wehrmacht and
those whose fathers and grandfathers fought for Hitler. Thomas Schmid, the reporter
who interviewed Reemtsma in 1999 for the publication Die Welt, remarked during the
interview that the Wehrmacht generation seemed absentminded when it came to their
history. Schmid proposed that the exhibition forced these men to reacquire a
consciousness. Reemtsma clarified that he believed the members of that generation had
different perceptions, which made their reactions range from harsh denial to acceptance,
because the Institute’s exhibition seemed to them to be a collective accusation against the
entire Wehrmacht. Reemtsma further explained that there were also many who
welcomed the exhibition and told the Institute that such information should have been
revealed in 1945 or in the years since. 151
Hannes Heer, former 68er and organizer of the Wehrmacht exhibition, set out to
demythologize the members of the German military as the pawns of Hitler, an idea that
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fit quite comfortably into the two-wars theory developed in Germany as a way of
repressing the truth about the past. In the two-wars theory, the Second World War is cut
in half with Hitler and his murderous plan occupying one side of the war effort and the
Wehrmacht’s noble intentions of staving off communist hordes to protect Germany (and
indeed, all of Europe) on the other side. The HIS aimed to show World War II as an
inherently criminal war with the Wehrmacht not merely verstrickt (caught-up in), but
active participants. “According to Hannes Heer, one of the exhibition’s creators and its
most active proponent, the number of Jews killed ‘directly or indirectly’ by the
Wehrmacht can be put at 1 to 2.5 million”.152 The majority of Nazi atrocities were
committed on the eastern front and, because of Hitler’s ideological focus on the racial
war, the majority of the nearly twenty million Wehrmacht soldiers rotated through that
front. These twenty million young men comprised nearly a quarter of Nazi Germany’s
population. This meant that during the war nearly every German family was related to or
knew someone who was a member of the Wehrmacht, and the same was true in the
1990s. Immediately following the war and in the years after, veterans waged a campaign
to whitewash their reputation, called Persilschein. Veterans’ organizations would, and
still do, hire lawyers to defend the honor of the Wehrmacht and discredit the research of
such historians as Manfred Messerschmidt153 of the Militärgeschichtlisches
Forschungsamt (Military History Research Organization).154
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Objections and the Bundestag
Resistance to the Wehrmachtsausstellung was not limited to veterans, however.
Debunking such an entrenched myth as that of twenty million innocent young men was
certain to be met with backlash from many directions. Initial objections were visceral
and political. Many Germans reacted negatively to the images displayed by the HIS,
challenging what they claimed was a one-sided argument. Some responded personally by
relating lengthy autobiographical stories. These veterans sought to rebut the evidence by
presenting their own memories, while children and grandchildren would relate stories
told them by a father or grandfather. Some of the stories related by visitors were not
accurate. “A man, nearly 80, came to us [the HIS] and told us a story of how a group of
Jewish children were saved. It involved a known case and we were able to prove to the
visitor, with all kinds of sources, that the children had in fact been murdered.”155
The personal impact of the history presented by the HIS, even at a distance of
fifty years, was compounded by the political aspect that split Germany down the middle.
The leftist political groups such as the Green Party (a political party containing a number
of former 68ers) strongly supported the exhibition. Rightist political groups such as the
CDU and the CSU were hostile to the efforts of Heer and the HIS. The political division
sparked protests and demonstrations on both sides.156 Then, in 1997, the controversy was
taken up by the Bundestag (the German Parliament).
By the time the Wehrmachtsausstellung reached Munich in February 1997 it was
alternately condemned as a generalized indictment and haled as a torch of illumination.
The German Parliament took up the debate in March of that year. On 13 March, the
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Green Party led the discussion when Representative Gerald Häfner defended the
exhibition as a source of truth. Häfner also expressed concern about
Geschichtsklitterung, which he believed held sway over Germany. Geschichtsklitterung
is a kind of historical falsification where historical events or facts are joined in
misleading ways. It also refers to the omission of vital facts in order to slant evidence to
fit a preformed conclusion. This type of falsification is frequently used to whitewash war
crimes and to enhance the positive aspects of a biography or an event. The purpose of
Geschichtsklitterung is to provide a conclusion differing from that of accepted
historiography.157 Häfner accused the right-wing parties of this type of myth-making
when they condemned the Wehrmacht exhibition for waging a moralischen
Vernichtungsfeldzugs gegen das deutsche Volk (moral destruction campaign against the
German people), a statement Häfner classified as right-wing propaganda.158
Dr. Alfred Dregger of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), a conservative
political party, rejected Häfner’s entire speech. Dregger then questioned the true purpose
of the Wehrmachtsausstellung and the legitimacy of Hannes Heer and Jan Philipp
Reemtsma. Dregger accused both men of attempting to hurt the German people
deliberately by foisting their subjective opinion on them. He went on to exonerate not
only the majority of the Wehrmacht but also the German people who lived under the
Third Reich by separating them from “the criminal clique who had taken control.”
Dregger spoke at length of the innocence of the Wehrmacht, citing many of the
established arguments including the acquittal at Nuremberg. He stated that all those who
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described the Wehrmacht as a criminal organization lied. Classifying those Germans
who made such arguments as self-haters, he declared that they distracted everyone from
the most important thing: “the deep mourning for victims of war and despotism…and of
the infinite loss which the Nazis caused by the destruction of the German Jews. Who
knows what contributions they could have made to German science, to the German
economy and to German culture.” By Dregger’s definition, the Jews were a commodity
and the German people and the men of the Wehrmacht were the victims. Lastly, Dregger
dismissed the Wehrmachtsausstellung as having nothing to contribute to German society
but destructive generational conflict.159
When former 68er lawyer and future Minister of the Interior Otto Schily
addressed the assembly, he related the discussion to the debate over the realizing of
German history begun by the students in the 1960s. Schily had been a friend of Rudi
Dutschke’s and had worked closely with the SDS. He was also one of the lawyers who
had defended many members of the 1970s left-wing terrorist group, Rote Armee
Fraktion, including Horst Mahler.160 In 1997, Schily made the same accusations against
the right-wing political parties that the 68ers had made against the war generation: they
were guilty of an indignation and inability to face the historical truth concerning the
crimes of the Nazi dictatorship. He deplored the attempts made by political opponents to
discredit and dismantle the exhibition. He also called for the use of more direct language
in discussions of National Socialist history. “The debate on the role of the Wehrmacht is
difficult and painful, certainly. But it is inevitable. Unfortunately, the grammar of the

159

Deutscher Bundestag, “13. Wahlperiode,” 14711-14712.
Deutsches Historisches Museum Berlin LeMO: Lebendiges virtuelles Museum Online, “Biographie:
Otto Schily, geb. 1932.” Available from http://www.dhm.de/lemo/suche, s.v. “Otto Schily;” accessed 23
May 2007.
160

71

political language prefers the passive in historical retrospectives: it became, it passed, it
occurred, it happened. The subject, the individual, the debt, the responsibility disappears
behind these veils of words.”161 But, he warned against the temptation of selfrighteousness so often present in the accusations of the 1960s. He charged every German
to deal honestly with his/herself and also to ask one more important question: how would
you have acted in such an extreme situation as that illustrated by the exhibition?162
Schily’s statements before the Bundestag during the Wehrmachtsausstellung debate are
illustrative of how the argument of the 68ers had matured in thirty years to include other
perspectives and a greater consideration for the hardships of their parents’ generation.
The 68ers made accusations and passed judgment on the war generation when
they began their movement in the mid to late 1960s. It was a hostile and severely
politicized and polemicized environment. While the Wehrmacht exhibition was met with
hostility, particularly from conservative politicians and right-wing extremists, there was
less of a sense of accusation in the questions from the younger generations. Finally, the
important questions were being asked by a German public inspired to confront the truth.
“Thanks to the Wehrmacht exhibit, Germans broke the cycle of reiteration and
repetition.”163 The exhibition, funded in part by former 68ers-turned-politicians and
created by former 68er Hannes Heer, did spur great debate, but it also opened the door to
communication between the generations; particularly between the war generation and
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their grandchildren.164 Such questioning and unburdening was documented and often
filmed by the HIS and negated the fears of destructive generational confusion and
conflict expressed by the exhibition’s detractors in March 1997.
Hannes Heer made a distinction between the intentions of the protestors in the
1960s and the purpose of his Wehrmacht exhibition. The 68ers had initiated a dialogue
with the past by framing it as an indictment of their parents. In the 1990s, their tactic
changed from demanding answers of their fathers to inquiry and self-reflection. Echoing
Schily, Heer stated that:
Only if we can supplement the question “Father, where
were you?” with the question “On which side would I have
stood? How would I have reacted?” will we be able to
bring this war to an end.165
Most likely, the war to which Heer referred was not the Second World War, but the
friction between the generations sparked by the 68ers.
In thirty years, many 68ers had continued their search for the truth about their
parents’ National Socialist past, as illustrated by the Wehrmachtsausstellung. They spent
their time writing articles and books as well as organizing and participating in historical
conferences, debates, and exhibitions. Many former 68ers, like Hannes Heer, dedicated
their lives to uncovering and analyzing the truth about Germany’s history. Others, like
Otto Schily, embraced political office as the next stage of life. All of them, however, left
an indelible mark on Germany and the study of German history during their long march
through the institutions; a march that culminated in the 68er administration of Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder, elected in 1998.
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CHAPTER 4
TWO AFFAIRS: THE 68ER ADMINISTRATION AND THE END OF THE LONG
MARCH

From headstrong teenagers to rebellious college students and street fighters to
driven professionals and politicians—the 68ers ran the gamut of possibilities in one
generation, leaving few stones unturned and few authorities unchallenged. However, the
new generation of Germany in the new millennium was seeking something other than
68er idealism and the unrest that tended to accompany it. In 2001, the controversy over
Germany’s past shifted again. As before, during the student revolts, objectors were
pointing fingers at Germany’s public officials. This time, however, the controversy was
not surrounding National Socialism and the Nazi generation, it was the 68ers. The
accusations made in 2001 themselves differed very little from those made in 1968. It was
already common practice “to use the secure footing of the present to criticize the deeds of
one’s parents and grandparents.”166 Back in the spotlight, the 68ers were being called
upon by the next generation to give an accounting for their actions decades prior. As
they had confronted their parents, the 68ers of the Nachkriegsgeneration were confronted.
After the violence of the 1970s, which disillusioned more than one 68er, the
former student radicals and street fighters continued on their long march through the
institutions. Having fought the establishment for a number of years, many of them
entered that establishment as politicians. Two former 68ers-turned-politicans rose to
prominence in the ensuing years. Gerhard Schröder and the extremely popular Joschka
Fischer formed the vanguard of the new administration. Referred to as the 68er
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administration, a socialist lawyer and a street-fighting autodidact completed the 68er
journey through Germany’s institutions.
Gerhard Schröder was a member of the Young Socialists and became chairman of
that organization in 1978. He entered law school in 1966 and passed all requisite legal
exams ten years later in 1976. A Marxist and an environmentalist from the beginning,
Schröder entered parliament in 1980 as a Social Democrat, the same year the Green Party
was officially formed.167 That was also the year he helped friend and former RAF
lawyer, Horst Mahler, re-enter society after being released from prison.
Joschka Fischer, the son a butcher, dropped out of school in 1965 and two years
later, became deeply involved in the left-wing demonstrations in Stuttgart, moving from
there to Frankfurt.168 Fischer cited the killing of Benno Ohnesorg in 1967 as a moment
that would help define him. “Looking back, his death was a tragedy that more than
anything else, made me want to get involved in politics. I wanted to make sure that
nothing like that could ever happen in Germany again.”169 A self-styled autodidact,
Fischer’s radicalist roots led him to join the Green Party and become a parliamentary
representative in 1983, while his own ambition helped him lead his party into power in
Schröder’s 1998 administration. It was not an easy victory for Fischer. Around the
reunification of Germany, the Green Party had lost popularity and was split between the
Realos and the Fundis. Moderating his youthful radicalism, Fischer, as a Realo, wanted
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the Greens to work within the political establishment. The Fundis, in a nod to the party’s
68er roots, wanted a return to the streets and the Außerparlamentarische Opposition. The
Realos won the argument and the Green Party subsequently gained more popular national
support.170
Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, both the Green Party and the Social
Democratic Party gained influence and popularity until in 1998, with the election of
Gerhard Schröder as Chancellor of Germany, the two political parties entered into the
Red/Green Coalition headed by Schröder and Joschka Fischer, Minister of the Foreign
Office. When Fischer was beginning his street-fighting in the mid 1960s, Schröder was
pursuing his law degree and idealizing Chancellor Willy Brandt. Brandt’s Ostpolitik
(East-Politics) was a strong influence on Schröder and inspired his attempts to bring
Germany closer to Eastern Europe. Backed by the popularity of Fischer and his Greens,
Schröder guided their coalition on a left-center path: approving the dismantling of
Germany’s nineteen nuclear power stations over a twenty-year period171 and providing
initial support for the United States’ war on terror (support which was publicly unpopular
in Germany). Schröder and Fischer, neither an avowed pacifist, steered Germany back to
the more popular anti-war, anti-military position in time to be narrowly re-elected in
2002.172 Within three years, Schröder’s emphasis on Ostpolitik and a mishandling of visa
reform by Fischer’s office would mean the end of the 68er administration.
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This 68er administration was the first German government since 1945 that had no
direct ties to either World War II or the Nazis. Thirty years from their defining moment,
the 68ers took control of the establishment, with Fischer carrying much of the popularity.
But the scruffy, long-haired rebel was no longer visible; instead, the 68er administration
presented a clean-cut, Italian-suited visage to the world. Fischer entered politics as the
casual street-fighter, even wearing sneakers to his swearing-in in the early 1980s. Once
achieving real power in the German government in the 1990s, however, Fischer shed his
rebellious past and gritty image for that of a polished, suit-adorned political leader. The
student radicals and street-fighters appeared to have matured and left their radicalism
behind, something Bettina Röhl and some members of the German press interpreted as
hypocrisy.
The Fischer Affair
In January 2001, two events collided to create what the news media dubbed the
Fischer Affair. Bettina Röhl had presented the press with what appeared to be
incriminating photographs of Joschka Fischer attacking a police officer in the early
1970s. Concurrently, Fischer was called as a witness in the murder trial of former 68erturned-terrorist, Hans-Joachim Klein.
Bettina Röhl173, the daughter of RAF terrorist Ulrike Meinhof, was compiling
information for a book about her mother and the RAF when she came upon old photos of
Fischer in his street-fighting days. In the 1960s, Ulrike Meinhof and Bettina Röhl’s
father, Klaus Rainer Röhl, published the leftist magazine Konkret in West Germany.
Five years after contributing to the so-called Fischer Affair, Bettina Röhl published an
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exposé of her parents and their magazine designed to reveal its communist base and the
links between Konkret, East Germany and the 68ers.174 Calling her mother an “Eastobsessed 26-year-old brat” and her father a “useful idiot,” Röhl had dedicated a majority
of her journalism to exposing the motivations behind her extremist parents and other
1960s’ radicals like Joschka Fischer.175 On her website, Röhl explained that her purpose
for publishing the eleven photographs was to unmask the “fraud” of Joschka Fischer.
The pictures were taken during a demonstration in Frankfurt in 1973 by Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung photographer, Lutz Kleinhans. Röhl questioned why it took twentyseven years for these images to reach the public; her conclusion was a Fischer-based
conspiracy to hide his violent past.176 The scene in the photos was described by Röhl for
a book entitled, Sag Mir, wo Du stehst:
At the beginning of April 1973, there was a large
demonstration. Joschka Fischer tackled a policeman and
set the overwhelming scenario [Überwältigungsszenario] in
motion, as had been practiced. In the following seconds, he
and four of his comrades-in-arms [Kampfgenossen]
surrounded the policeman on the ground. Fischer raised his
hand to strike. The event was interrupted when two fellow
police officers rushed in and grabbed the weapon.177
When interviewed by Stern about his past, Fischer stated that he had been a
militant and a street-fighter and had never denied the fact, but he vehemently denied ever
attacking police with weapons. Fischer stated that he fought government authority but
also “fought against the pressure of events that was causing some to break away in the
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mid 70s and go underground.”178 Hans-Joachim Klein, Fischer’s friend and Mitläufer
(nominal member) in the street-fighting scene, was one of those breaking away to
become more radical. When asked if he felt responsible for Klein’s descent into
terrorism, Fischer denied having any negative influence over either Klein or the other
more violent members of the 68er protests. Stern asked Fischer to explain to young
Germans how he could have participated in demonstrations that had frequently turned
violent.
Vietnam, Notstandgesetzte, the attempted assassination of
Rudi Dutschke, the suspicious continuity between the Nazi
state and the Federal Republic. …We encountered so much
hate when we demonstrated for freedom. If you go
demonstrating today, you no longer hear: ‘Go away!’ [Geh
nach drüben!]. That was only the most harmless variant.
‘Off to the labor camp!’ [Ab ins Arbeitslager!] or ‘You
should be gassed!’ [Ihr gehört vergast!], we heard that a
lot. …I got my first five weeks without probation because
of resistance against government authority [Widerstand
gegen die Staatsgewalt], disturbing the peace
[Landfriedensbruch], and violation of the
Bannmeilengesetz179. …All these events. They [today’s
youth] must see the general context. …For us, the German
democracy appeared to show a National Socialist face
again. …That set us on the path where the question of
enmity in relation to the state was no longer a question of
theory, but where one wanted the complete fall of the
constitutional order—that sounds so crazy today.180
The violence of the 68ers’ conflict with authority continued to escalate until it
erupted in the 1970s. Several 68ers, including Hans-Joachim Klein, became violently
anti-Israel. Two Frankfurt Germans participated in the 1976 hijacking of the Air France
flight where the Jewish passengers were separated from the other passengers and killed.
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Such actions disillusioned Fischer and others. Fischer described the murders of the
passengers as “disgustingly terrible.”181 Severe anti-Semitism also became Klein’s reason
for leaving the violence behind. He became disillusioned with anti-Zionism during a
training stint in the Middle East. Klein told Daniel Cohn-Bendit (fellow 68er and friend
to both Klein and Fischer) that he and the other militant leftists were being trained next to
fascists at the camp. Klein claimed to be shocked that the Palestinian cause was not the
anti-fascist, anti-Nazi one he had believed it to be. Rather, it was simply an anti-Jewish
cause.182 A similar shock ran through the German New Left at the discovery of the
identity of the Air France hijackers killed at Entebbe. When the terrorist leader was
revealed as Wilfried Böse, Fischer was dumbfounded that a friend of his would resort to
such anti-Zionist violence.183
By the mid 1970s, with the drastic increase in leftist terrorism, the idealism was
being drained from the 68er revolution. Actions began to have dire and often bloody
consequences. The bloodshed at Entebbe was a direct result of the anti-Semitic, antiIsrael resolutions passed at the PLO conference in Algeria, which Fischer had attended in
1969. The 68er revolution had mutated from sit-ins, demonstrations, and pamphleteering
to kidnapping and murder. The increasingly violent nature of some members of the New
Left made Fischer extremely uncomfortable. He recognized the fine line the 68ers were
walking when resorting to any kind of violence. Declaring that he had never been a
pacifist, Fischer, as Foreign Minister, acknowledged repeatedly the necessity of the use
of force in certain situations. The Foreign Minister illustrated his belief when he
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supported armed NATO action in the former Yugoslavia to end the genocide there,
saying, “The answer to Auschwitz is not never again war but never again Auschwitz.”184
However, he also understood the dangers that any use of force contained for his
generation. The year 1976 represented for Fischer a terrible hypocrisy: his generation
was stepping over the same line they had accused their parents of crossing.
When questioned about his past, Fischer, both in the press and on the witness
stand at Klein’s murder trial, apologized for the violence of the radical 1960s and 70s.
He lamented that any of the 68ers had turned to killing. In January 2001, Hans-Joachim
Klein was tried for the 1975 murders of three officials participating in the OPEC
conference in Vienna. The Foreign Minister appeared as a character witness for the
defense and was questioned by the prosecution about violence in his own radical past. In
a symbolic and a very real way, the 68ers were on trial. One 68er who had turned his
youthful idealism into terrorism and murder had as a character witness another 68er who
had fashioned his own youthful idealism into a high-ranking position in the very
establishment they had both once fought against. On the stand, Fischer described the
initial 68er motive as a desire to organize a Gegenwelt (counter culture). Both on the
stand and in the Stern interview, Fischer explained that their youth was a different life, a
different time and place. In the interview, the Foreign Minister never acceded to
committing any real violence beyond throwing a few stones. The most he admitted to
Stern was “resisting” the police. At Klein’s trial, Fischer was questioned repeatedly
about throwing Molotov cocktails at police, an allegation Bettina Röhl had made about
Fischer in the press. Prosecutor Volker Rath confronted Fischer with having allegedly
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admitted to such actions on television. Fischer denied having thrown the flaming
projectiles and denied ever inciting the Frankfurt street-fighters to do so themselves.
Rath then mentioned a statement allegedly made by one of Fischer’s former roommates
and provided to the prosecutor’s office by Bettina Röhl. Rath claimed that the statement
provided proof that what the prosecutor called the Fischer Wohngemeinschaft (Fischer
Commune) was the fertile ground for the RAF. Fischer dismissed the statement as
Völliger Quatsch (complete rubbish) while the judge declared it irrelevant. Rath then
accused Fischer again of throwing Molotov cocktails and avoiding the question. Fischer
replied: “No you don’t. I don’t evade anything. I exclude. Clear. Explicit. Period.”185
The Röhl photographs and Fischer’s testimony at the Klein trial expanded into
threats of parliamentary inquiries and criminal investigations. The Foreign Minister’s
irreverent attitude toward many of his political fellows had not gained him many friends
in the German government. Some, particularly those in the opposition parties, saw an
opportunity to discredit Fischer and the Red/Green Coalition.186 However, throughout
the Fischer Affair, the Foreign Minister remained extremely popular with the German
public. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the former Young Socialist, defended his
irreverent friend and the young radicals of their generation: “This republic would be quite
different without the 68ers. It would lack the general openness with regard to many
social-political questions, including questions as to the causes of fascism.”187 The 68ers
were once more center-stage but had come under scrutiny for their own histories. No
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longer the new generation, the former radicals were the ones being forced to provide an
account of their pasts. Fischer’s former roommate and France’s most prominent 68er,
Daniel Cohn-Bendit, was quoted as saying: “At long last there is a German politician
who says, ‘Yes, it was me;’” ironically, the same thing Hitler said at his trial in 1924.
Along with this approbation for Fischer’s admission, Cohn-Bendit expressed
dissatisfaction with the absence of other politicians willing to admit to Communist or
Nazi pasts.188 While friends spoke out in support of the Foreign Minister, Bettina Röhl
and Michael Schwelien (Fischer biographer) openly accused Fischer of deliberately
encouraging and participating in violence against police at demonstrations in the 1960s
and 1970s. 189
Fischer supporters and Fischer detractors lined up on either side of a generational
debate: was a radical and (disputably) violent past acceptable in Germany’s politicians of
today if it was unacceptable in Germany’s politicians of thirty years ago? The Fischer
Affair represented the next step in the generational conflict begun by Fischer’s
generation.
The main subject in the Fischer affair was a simple political
scandal involving a well-regarded foreign minister. But the
scandal was set against a background consisting of events
from twenty-five or thirty years earlier, from the time of the
New Left. The Fischer affair invited us, even required us,
to make a few judgments about that background. But the
New Left background turned out, on closer inspection, to
have a background of its own…. Not the generation of
1968, but the generation of 1938. Not the New Left, but
the Nazis.190
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In Fischer’s youth, anyone with a definably National Socialist background was
unacceptable in any public office. His generation was imminently instrumental in
exposing the objectionable histories of a number of West Germany’s most prominent
politicians, including Chancellor Kiesinger. But, while Joschka Fischer may have never
attempted to hide his own radical past, he, like his parents’ generation before him, made
no attempt to address it directly until the issue was forced by the next generation. It was
not until 2001 that Fischer discussed or analyzed his own past openly. A published
author by 2001, his book was not about the student revolts or the Frankfurt streetfighters; rather, it was about his life-affirming weight-loss.191 The Röhl photographs and
the Klein trial forced Fischer and the 68er administration to answer the question, “where
were you then and what did you do?”
The Visa Affair
The 68er administration would survive the Fischer Affair of 2001 with popularity
and reputation largely intact. However, in 2005, the German Foreign Office came under
heavy attack when a loophole in recent immigration legislation was discovered by the
press, though that legislation had actually been revoked a year earlier. In an effort to
further relations with former Eastern Bloc countries, Fischer’s Foreign Office had
modified its immigration policies and procedures in March 2000 under the “Volmer
Edict”.192 The edict relaxed the restrictions for accepting tourist visas in Germany. The
mandate from Fischer’s office to all German consulates was, “when in doubt, decide for
freedom of travel.” By the next year, over 300,000 Ukrainians had applied for tourist
visas with only ten percent rejected. One of the main concerns at the time was the 11%
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unemployment rate in Germany. Some German officials were worried that a large
number of these foreign tourists would become de facto immigrants, which would then
further exacerbate the unemployment issue Chancellor Schröder had promised to
address.193
Even worse than the unemployment issue was that, unfortunately, the new visa
policy allowed a large number of criminals into Germany indefinitely, including known
human-traffickers and members of prostitution rings. Relaxing the policy on temporary
visa approval in favor of the applicant had flooded the consulates with a large number of
requests they were not staffed to handle; requests that were then rubber-stamped without
the proper background checks. This allowed young women forced into sexual slavery to
enter the country as “tourists” and pimps to pass as “business travelers.”194
Fellow European Union Schengen Agreement member states began to complain
to Berlin that lax German visa regulations were impacting them as well. The Schengen
Agreement of 1985 involved thirty European nation-states, including Germany. In 1995,
Germany and five other European countries including France and Spain officially
implemented Schengen, which meant that once legally in one Schengen member nation, a
person could move freely through all other Schengen participant nations without further
passport checks. 195 If criminals were entering Germany legally, then by extension, they
could move freely in France, Spain, and many other nations, without need of separate
French or Spanish visas. In 2004, under pressure from these other Schengen nations,
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Germany revoked the Volmer Edict. Deputy Foreign Minister Volmer, when questioned
about Germany’s visa policy change, alternated between taking all the blame on himself
and placing the majority of it on Fischer, saying that Fischer had forced him to change
the regulations in 2000 despite his own misgivings.196
The Visa Affair was the second time in less than five years that Foreign Minister
and former 68er Joschka Fischer occupied an unfavorable spotlight. The Süddeutsche
Zeitung posed the question: “To what extent was it really Green ideological blindness
which damaged German interests because it simply dismissed the many warnings?”197
As the head of one half of the Red/Green Coalition, Fischer came under attack for his
administration’s idealism. Germany’s relationship with its Gastarbeiteren (guest
workers) and immigrants had been shaky at best and throughout the 1990s attacks on
immigrants had increased in the more heavily populated areas of Germany. The
Red/Green Coalition had intended to establish Germany officially as an immigrant nation
in the new millennium. By encouraging the immigration of Eastern Europeans, Fischer
intended not only to support Schröder’s relationship with those nations but also perhaps
to atone for the sin of Auschwitz.198
Altruism aside, as an investigative committee and the news media dug deeper into
the stacks of visa applications and consulate paperwork, a growing number of infractions
were discovered with some of the more serious ones involving Albania. After the
introduction of the Volmer Edict in 2000, the number of approved visas coming from
Tirana increased by over 10,000, jumping from 8,000 to 19,000. During the
196
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investigation, stacks of bribe money were found hidden in between the applications while
some approved applications had never been signed by the applicants. This led Berlin to
believe that the German consulate in Albania was being used as a human-trafficking
weigh-station.199 Over 800,000 Germans watched as Fischer gave testimony before a
parliamentary investigative committee in 2005. The Financial Times Deutschland
remarked on Fischer’s twelve-hour testimony: “He was quite the old Joschka Fischer—
belligerent, lacking respect, eloquent and witty. But his show was being played out in the
wrong theater. It was all about how far he is responsible for mass human trafficking
offences and from this point of view he wasn’t convincing.”200 The negative publicity of
the Visa Affair became a storm that Fischer and the 68er administration could not ignore.
All of this reflected very badly on a Foreign Minister, an administration, and two
political parties that had prided themselves on humanitarianism and opposition to
oppression. The mainstream German press accused Fischer of ignoring a potentially
dangerous issue while more extreme accusations of supporting international prostitution
and slave trading flowed toward Germany from the international press. Unfortunately for
the 68er administration, the explosive Visa Affair hit them during an election year.
Neither Fischer, nor the rest of the Schröder administration survived the Visa Affair
intact the way they had the Fischer Affair involving controversial photographs and a
sensational murder trial four years earlier. German voters expressed their lack of
confidence in the 68ers by voting them out of government in 2005. The long march of
the 68ers had come to an end.
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Their administration is currently being analyzed, but what is the real legacy of the
German 68ers? They progenerated the frank discussions of National Socialism taking
place in Germany today. Their legacy also lies in the galvanization of Germany’s
commitment to anti-fascism and behind every one of the memorials to the victims of the
Third Reich. They helped establish the equality of the sexes that elected a female
chancellor and inspired a commitment to improving immigrant relations and citizenship
reform. The 68ers opened the eyes of a nation and ensured that Germany’s past will
never be ignored or forgotten.
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CHAPTER 5
MARCH CONCLUDED?
The 68ers, famous for their student protests in favor of democracy, for their
confrontation of their parents’ Nazi history, and, notoriously, for the violence of the
1970s, were extremely popular in 1998 when Schröder’s administration took power. But
their latest legacy was unfavorably marked by rising unemployment and a serious
mishandling of visa reform. In 2001, the most popular member of the 68er government,
Joschka Fischer, was confronted with his own violent past in much the same way as he
and his compatriots confronted the National Socialist generation. In 2005, the long
march through the institutions came to an end as the so-called Visa Affair broke and the
68er administration was voted out of power. Following his coalition’s election defeat,
Joschka Fischer resigned from politics altogether; taking up, instead, a teaching post at
Princeton University in 2006. Rounding out an incredibly dynamic career, Fischer went
from being a drop-out autodidact, to a street-fighter, to Foreign Minister and ViceChancellor of Germany, to professor of “International Crisis Diplomacy” at one of the
United States’ most prestigious universities. 201
What kind of mark these former young radicals will continue to make on
Germany remains to be seen. “Although some aspects of the 1960s’ baby boom
liberalism is now deeply rooted in German society, in many other respects 1968er
radicalism (moderated with age) seems to have passed through the system leaving few
marks on the successor generation.”202 The time of the 68ers had passed, as evidenced by
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the election of the more conservative CDU government and Chancellor Angela Merkel.
Will there be a new study of the National Socialist period through the lens of a new
generation standing on the other side of the impassioned 68er protest? Maybe yes,
maybe no. The new generation, “many of whom are indifferent or even hostile to the
values of the 1968ers,” is less interested in confronting Germany’s Nazi past and
practicing 68er idealism than it is interested in solving unemployment and reforming the
German economy. This new generation does not have to confront Germany’s past in
order to take their place in their nation. They do not have to fight against remnant Nazis
in power, they way their parents did. Germany’s youth are more concerned with world
conflict and the environment. In 2006, despite being defeated by the CDU, the Green
Party still held fifty percent of the under-twenty-five-year-old vote.203 Those voters
represent the first generation of Germans to grow up in a Germany involved in a dialogue
with its National Socialist past. By the turn of the last century, there were approximately
four thousand museums in Germany which displayed exhibits concerning some aspect of
the Second World War and the Third Reich. By the year 2000, Germany was spending
DM 115 million a year on Holocaust memorials.204 Rather than having to fight silent
shadows to learn about the past, today’s Germans are immersed in their nation’s history,
thanks to the efforts of the 68ers throughout the years.205
The 68ers’ confrontation with the past has left a deep mark in every corner of
German society, but their path was not always clear. Their long march through the
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institutions had been, at times, a confusing one. In 1999 when NATO attacked Slobodan
Milosevic in Belgrade, Joschka Fischer publicly supported the action and Germany sent
in its own air support. Fischer characterized his support as a uniquely German
responsibility to oppose genocide wherever found. His Green Party strongly dissented
and Fischer was hit with a red paint bomb at the 1999 Green Party conference in protest
against the military action Fischer had sanctioned. Instead of adhering to his political
party’s dedicated pacifism, Fischer, in a throw-back to his radical past, decided that no
action was worse than intervention.
With the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Schröder, backed by
his 68er administration, declared “unconditional solidarity” with the U.S. and promised
support in the U.S.’s war on terror. Overcoming a vote of no confidence in the
Bundestag, the 68er administration sent troops to Afghanistan. Then, in 2002, Schröder
and Fischer opposed the proposed American attack on Iraq. In concert with German
public opinion, Schröder and Fischer refused to support a war on Iraq, with Fischer
returning to the German Green Party mantra of “never again war;” this time without the
“never again Auschwitz” emphasis.206
The new, younger German government of 2006 has promised to draw Germany
closer to the United States and to establish a more comprehensive, Western-based foreign
policy than Fischer and Schröder’s Ostpolitik-inspired approach. Unlike the prior
administration, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government is not based in 1968. Rather,
the new government takes 1989 and reunification as its springboard. The German voters
in 2005 appeared to be seeking more stability than the 68ers gave them, electing instead a
chancellor who favors the conservative values of Adenauer’s administration, the very
206
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thing the 68ers opposed. But, the very fact that Germany’s chancellor is female is
another nod to all that the 68ers managed to change. The 68ers protested against their
parents’ silence and governmental hypocrisy, they protested in favor of sexual liberation
and equal treatment for women. The 68ers created the society and government that
Angela Merkel and the new generation has inherited.207
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